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Abstract 
 
 Guided by a theoretical framework derived from principal-agent models, persistence 
theories or college impact models, and microeconomic theory, the present study utilized 
multilevel modeling techniques to assess the correlation between state funding vehicles of 
appropriations, need-based financial aid, and merit-based financial aid and graduation rates after 
controlling for known covariates at the institution and state levels.  The present study also 
evaluated the correlation between funding vehicles and minority student graduation rates as well 
as determined if funding vehicles impact institutions with greater percentages of minority 
students differently than those with a less diverse student population.  The present study 
extended the existing literature in four key ways: by expanding the examination of state funding 
policy beyond the first-year indicator of retention; by evaluating the use of each of the three 
funding vehicles rather than an either-or approach; by including state-level variables in 
explaining differences in graduation rates across institutions; and by utilizing averaged 
longitudinal data as the covariates in the model.  The results demonstrated that appropriations per 
capita was significantly and negatively related to institutional graduation rates, and that need-
based and merit-based financial aid were significantly and positively related to institutional 
graduation rates.  In terms of minority student graduation rates, need-based financial aid and 
merit-based financial aid both had a significant positive relationship with black student 
graduation rates; while merit-based financial aid was significant and positively related to 
Hispanic student graduation rates.  Finally, while the relationship between appropriations per 
capita and graduation rates did not vary significantly across states, there was significant variation 
in the relationship when minority student percentage was taken into account. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 State funding of public four-year higher education institutions totaled more than $92 
billion for academic year ending in 2015 (Grapevine, 2016; NASSGAP, 2016).  Institutions and 
students accepted the $81.9 billion in appropriations and $10.3 billion in student financial aid, 
yet only 34% and 58% of students that enrolled full-time in public institutions graduated from 
that institution within four years and six years respectively (Grapevine, 2016; NASSGAP, 2016; 
U.S. Department of Education, 2016).   Even when disaggregating the data, the best performing 
state only had a six-year graduation rate of 69.2% as compared to the worst performing at 26.9% 
in 2015 (National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, 2016). If one were to 
utilize graduation rates as a single key outcome metric of success, public colleges and 
universities are not performing well in retaining students and ensuring persistence to graduation. 
States provide financial support to public institutions of higher education to subsidize 
costs, thereby expanding access and encouraging more degree completions by which the 
economy and society benefit (Titus, 2009). While the amount of funding has increased in terms 
of dollar values in some states, the relative amount of this funding has decreased both in terms of 
percentage of state budgets as well as percentage of institutional budgets across the board 
(Harter, Wade, & Watkins, 2005; Tandberg, 2010a).   Interestingly, even as institutions are 
increasing tuition in order to make up for the state revenue decreases (Oliff, Palacios, Johnson, & 
Leachman, 2013) there does not seem to be a dampening of the demand for a college degree with 
public undergraduate enrollment from Fall of 1990 to Fall of 2015 increasing by nearly 38% 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2016). Also, as family incomes have not grown at the 
same rate as tuition prices (Mitchell, Palacios, & Leachman, 2014), but the demand to attend 
college is still high, more and more students and families are turning to student loans to fund the 
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gap between their tuition charges, financial aid, and what they can afford to pay out of pocket 
(Zhan, 2014; Long & Riley, 2007).   
While much of the literature in higher education rightfully focuses on the interests of 
direct stakeholders including students and institutions, I suggest the need to expand the lens to 
include impact on taxpayers as public higher education is the recipient of public funds.  Low 
graduation rates, for example, have primarily been examined as a problem for the students who 
drop out before graduation.  However, I suggest two major concerns for taxpayers regarding the 
combination of decreased state funding and low graduation rates.  First, students are receiving 
the benefit of state funding while not graduating in a timely manner, or at all.  A report from the 
American Institutes for Research calculated that states provided more than $6.2 billion in public 
funding for students who dropped out between their first and second year of college in 2009 
(Schneider, 2010).  Second, with increased tuition resulting largely from decreases in state 
support (Delaney, 2014), students have increasingly turned to loans to fund their education, often 
at levels that make repayment difficult or unfeasible, especially for college dropouts.  As an 
example, student loan debt has become greater than 10% of all household debt in this country at 
$1.16 trillion, and student loan delinquency rates reached 11.3% in the fourth quarter of 2014 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2015). Student loans are not necessarily a bad thing, as 
they can be the vehicle by which an individual otherwise unable to afford to attend college can 
obtain an education.  Especially for minority students, student loans are crucial for college access 
(Jackson & Reynolds, 2013; Baum & Steele, 2010).  However, there are numerous economic 
implications to increased student loan debt, including reduced retirement savings and 
discretionary investments, and decreased consumer spending – all of which are important drivers 
of the economy (Scott & Pressman, 2015; Ekici & Dunn, 2010). 
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The recent recession resulted in decreases in state revenues (Dadayan & Ward, 2011), 
and states were forced to make significant budgetary cuts to such services as healthcare and 
education (Zumeta, 2012).  As a discretionary item in state budgets, higher education has seen 
both disproportionate cuts and smaller increases during times of economic recession and growth 
respectively, as compared to other discretionary areas of spending (Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Dar 
& Lee, 2014).  As such, it is likely unrealistic to expect drastic increases in state funding due to 
these budgetary constraints. However, the decrease in state support should not be the only issue 
of concern to higher education stakeholders because the funding policies by which states choose 
to provide support for public colleges and universities can impact such factors as tuition, 
enrollment figures, access, and graduation rates (Heck, Lam, & Thomas, 2014; Titus, 2009; 
Ehrenberg, 2006; Hossler et al, 1997). That is, it is not just the amount of funding, but how the 
funding is allocated – be it by appropriations or financial aid – that has an impact on institutional 
behavior and outcomes (Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010; Titus, 2009).   
The examination of of factors that impact graduation rates is not new to the higher 
education research arena.  For example, prior research has evaluated the impact of institutional 
expenditures on graduation rates (Zhang, 2009).  Three key variables in these studies include 
expenditures on instruction (Hasbrouck, 1997), expenditures on academic support (Ryan, 2004), 
as well as the use of contingent faculty rather than full-time tenure-track faculty members 
(Ehrenberg & Zhang, 2005); all of which have been found to affect student performance and thus 
institutional graduation rates.  However, perhaps examining the issue via institutional 
expenditures is not the only or best means of evaluation.  According to resource dependency 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), external resource providers are the primary influencers of 
internal organizational decisions, including expenditure allocations.  Fowles (2014), for example, 
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found that the level of expenditure on instruction was greatly impacted by the source and type of 
revenue, and Hasbrouck (1997) found that institutional expenditures on instruction were highly 
correlated with appropriations revenue rather than donations or contract revenue.  These types of 
findings support an evaluation of funding policy at the state level because how a state funds its 
public higher education institutions can have significant influence over operational decisions that 
impact graduation rates. That is, by merely evaluating the impact of expenditures at the 
institutional level on graduation rates, the state-level influence provided via resource distribution 
is left out of the analysis.  However, by examining institutional graduation rates under varied 
state funding policies, the impact of these state-level funding strategies can truly be assessed.  
For the purposes of this study, I seek to explore whether graduation rates are related to policies 
of appropriations and/or financial aid.  
How and why states fund public higher education 
Investment of public tax dollars into higher education has long been justified by the 
resultant public externalities that the state or society at large receives such as intellectual capital, 
important research contributions, increased community service, university extension programs, 
and an overall increase in wealth for the public due to increased education of the state’s 
population (The Institute for Higher Education Policy, 2005; Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby, & 
Vandenbussche, 2005; Boix, 2003).   Economically, increases in education and wealth also 
create a larger tax base for the state (Dar, 2012), which is certainly a public benefit for citizens.  
Additionally, states with greater levels of citizens with higher education fare better on key social 
metrics such as crime, health, employment, and community civic engagement (Dar, 2012; Baum 
& Ma, 2007; Dee, 2004). 
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There are three primary vehicles through which the states provide financial support for 
higher education: direct appropriations to institutions, as well as need-based and merit-based 
financial aid to students.  Each state employs its own funding strategy by choosing some 
combination of these funding vehicles to support its public institutions of higher education 
(Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010), with some states relying heavily on appropriations while others 
utilize high levels of financial aid.  The educational policymaking decisions are driven by a host 
of factors including the overall fiscal condition of the state; the type of governance structure of 
the state’s higher education system; level of emphasis on higher education funding by the 
governor, policymakers, and other elected officials; and relative costs for other state-supported 
functions including primary and secondary education, health and welfare initiatives or systems, 
or state correctional systems for example (Okunade, 2004).  Additional discussion regarding the 
specific variables that impact state funding structures will be provided in the literature review in 
the next chapter. 
The largest share of state funding for higher education comes in the form of direct 
financial appropriations to institutions within the state.  As mentioned, last year this figure 
totaled more than $81.9 billion to public colleges and universities (Grapevine, 2016).  Some 
education policymakers advocate that appropriations be used to decrease the tuition price for 
students of low socioeconomic status via high-tuition/high-aid models.  States, however, often 
use appropriations funding as a means to keep tuition prices low for all in-state students (Chen & 
St. John, 2011).  In terms of gaps in access, such a practice does not necessarily decrease the 
access gap for underrepresented minorities and low socioeconomic students as compared to their 
wealthier and/or white counterparts, because subsidized in-state tuition policies benefits all 
students in the state – including those without financial need who would likely attend college 
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with or without the subsidized tuition prices being offered at public institutions.  However, it is 
certainly a popular political claim to be able to tout low in-state tuition prices for a state’s 
residents. 
In terms of financial aid to students, there are two primary types of programs: need-based 
and merit-based programs.  As the name suggests, need-based aid programs are designed to 
ensure equal access for all prospective students, by removing financial barriers for students who 
do not have the financial means to cover their educational costs on their own.  Prior to the 1990s, 
nearly all state financial aid programs were need-based, and nearly all states continue to offer at 
least some type of need-based financial aid to their residents today (Cheslock & Hughes, 2011). 
Although the focus of this study is on the funding of higher education at the state level, it is 
worth noting that nearly all federal financial aid initiatives are need-based programs, including 
Pell grants, and subsidized Stafford loans (Baum & Ma, 2009).  Additionally, the federal 
government, in effect, set a precedent for higher education funding shifting from institutional-
level appropriations toward student-level funding with the passage of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 and subsequent reauthorization in 1972 which established what is now known as the Pell 
grant program (Atlas, 2015).  That is, students then became the primary determinants for where 
federal funds for higher education would be invested simply by choosing to attend one institution 
over another.  
Merit-based programs, on the other hand, emphasize academic accomplishment or 
achievement – regardless of the student’s financial position (Heller, 2002b).  Some states, such 
as Georgia with its HOPE program, have large-scale merit-based financial aid programs. By 
attaining a certain high school grade point average or by achieving a certain SAT score, residents 
of the state are able to attend the public institutions within the state at low or no cost.  The largest 
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programs are found in Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, and 
Kentucky, which collectively comprised more than 78% of merit-based state funding in 2013 
(NASSGAP, 2014), while other states may have smaller merit-based financial aid programs.  
With merit-based aid initiatives, states may reap certain economic benefits including an increase 
in the quality of students attending public institutions within the state (Domina, 2014), or the 
retention of high quality, high-performing students in the state following their graduation 
(Sjoquist & Winters, 2014). Groen (2011) evaluated the impact of a state-wide merit-based aid 
programs on college participation.  His findings, similar to appropriations funding mentioned 
above, suggest that while merit-based aid programs do seem to increase participation in higher 
education, the majority of the funding provided ends up benefiting students within the state who 
would have attended college with or without the aid.  While access is not improved for 
disadvantaged students through the use of merit-based aid programs, it is worth mentioning 
Groen’s additional finding that merit-based aid programs did seem to encourage choice of 
institution within the state, which can certainly be seen as a benefit for the state and its public 
higher education system.  Zhang, Hu, and Sensenig (2013) also evaluated the impact of the 
Bright Futures Scholarship Program, a merit-based financial aid program in Florida, on 
enrollment and degree production and found that the program did have a positive impact on 
undergraduate enrollment within the state, most likely due to a decrease in migration of students 
to institutions in other states.   
Reduction in state funding and privatization of higher education  
The public system of higher education is quite large, enrolling more than 5.2 million 
fulltime students at four-year colleges and universities in 2012 (National Center for Education 
Statistics, 2013a).  The issue of state funding is one of great importance not only for these 
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students, but also for the economy as a whole as tax dollars are invested to support public 
colleges and universities. The average amount of state funding for higher education, however, 
has not increased at the same rate as higher education costs faced by institutions (Harter, Wade, 
& Watkins, 2005) or at the same rate as overall state spending (Tandberg, 2010a).  In fact, per-
student investment by state governments decreased by more than 27% from the 2007-2008 
academic year to the 2012-2013 year (Oliff, Palacios, Johnson & Leachman, 2013).  As another 
example, the average amount of state support for higher education in 2013 was $5.45 per $1,000 
of personal income, which represents a reduction of nearly 31% from twenty years ago when 
controlling for inflation (Grapevine, 2014).  Of particular note is the variation in individual state 
support of higher education in 2013, ranging from $1.64 per $1,000 in personal income in New 
Hampshire to $11.92 in Wyoming.  Finally, the differences between states are especially 
apparent when examining the per capita investment in higher education.  The average for the 
country in 2013 was $230, but ranges anywhere from $65 per capita at the low end to $665 per 
capita at the top (Grapevine, 2014).  This variation among states’ funding policies provides an 
opportunity to examine the possible impact of funding vehicles on an outcome such as 
institutional graduation rates. 
The consequences of the significant slow-down in state fiscal support further contribute 
to the trend toward the privatization of higher education costs (Baum & Ma, 2009; Weerts & 
Ronca, 2006; Heller, 2006).  That is, state support of higher education has decreased and 
resultant tuition prices have increased at the very same time that more of the burden of those 
costs is being placed upon students and families.  Stated another way, without institutional 
endowments to make up for the decrease in state support and increased institutional costs, 
students and families must cover a greater share of their tuition.  As an example, in 1987, state 
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and local government revenue for public colleges and universities was more than three times the 
amount of revenue received from students, while tuition revenue grew to nearly the same amount 
as government revenue twenty-five years later (Oliff, Palacios, Johnson, & Leachman, 2013).  
Doyle and Delaney (2011) even conclude that legislators are viewing students and families as 
acceptable revenue sources for colleges and universities, thus furthering the trend toward 
decreased state support for higher education.  
Public impact of low graduation rates 
While the student-level concerns around high tuition, low graduation rates, and increased 
student debt burden are problematic enough for alarm; there are additional implications that must 
be considered when taking a macro view of the issue.  That is, high student debt levels in this 
country affect all citizens, and not just the individuals who actually took out the loans, as the 
impact of this increased debt on the economy extends beyond the ability for that individual to 
repay his or her loan.  For example, because students are leaving college with more debt than 
ever, they do not have the same level of disposable income as prior graduates.  Of the graduates 
from the 2007-2008 cohort, more than 31% had student loan payments greater than 12% of their 
annual salary, as compared to 18% of graduates from the 1999-2000 cohort (Woo, 2013); and the 
average cumulative student debt to annual income ratio for graduates increased from 49% in 
1994 to 62% in 2009 (Woo, 2013).  Prior discussion on this issue often stops at the student level 
concern of such statistics, but the concern should extend to all taxpayers as the economy in 
which they belong is impacted greatly.  As mentioned, high student loan payments have the 
result of decreasing one’s disposable income, and any reduction in disposable income has a 
negative effect on consumer consumption and discretionary or retirement investments (Scott & 
Pressman, 2015; Ekici & Dunn, 2010).  
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Many in the mainstream media are proclaiming the student debt issue in this country a 
crisis, even comparing it to the housing bubble burst in 2008.  Such news outlets as the New 
York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Fortune, USA Today, and the Huffington Post, to name a 
few, have all featured articles using the words ‘crisis’ in relation to student loans in this country 
(Carey, 2015; Ip, 2015; Snyder, 2015a; Weiss, 2015; Hildreth, 2015).  While I am not using the 
word ‘crisis’ myself, I do suggest that this country has a real problem in terms of student loan 
debt, particularly as it relates to the public investment in higher education.  That is, tax dollars 
are given to higher education institutions and students to support or subsidize education costs. 
However, it is important to note that many of the public economic benefits that could be derived 
from higher education result from graduation rather than mere attendance for some period of 
time.  That is, it is the college degree that will likely expand employment opportunities or 
increase salary potential.  Yet, as mentioned above, fewer than three in five students graduate 
from public institutions within six years (U.S. Department of Education, 2014).  In terms of 
public investment in higher education, this could mean that tax dollars are supporting and 
subsidizing costs for forty percent of students who might never complete a degree.  Additionally, 
in the long term, state and federal governments would miss out on the tax revenue from 
increased salary that the student would have likely earned had he or she graduated with a degree 
(Braxton et al., 2009).   
The issue of public higher education funding is one in which arguably all citizens are 
impacted either directly or indirectly; and therefore is one in which I suggest that additional 
research attention and political dialogue is needed.  Are states’ current funding policies both 
achieving the goal of effectively supporting public higher education and students while also 
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being responsible with taxpayer funds? Graduation rates are a key metric to consider in terms of 
public benefit from higher education.  
Statement of the Problem 
While each state employs its own unique higher education funding strategy with some 
combination of direct institutional appropriations, need-based student financial aid, and merit-
based student financial aid, there is no consistent evaluation of state-level higher education 
funding policy on the key outcome indicator of graduation rates.  Average six-year graduation 
rates below 60% for all public institutions and even dramatically lower rates for minority 
students, coupled with record high tuition prices at public colleges and universities, are 
contributing to a major financial issue in this country.  
Because education is a state-controlled function, there are fifty separate funding strategies 
for public higher education involving varied levels of appropriations, need-based aid, and/or 
merit-based aid.  For example, during the 2012 academic year, there were states that provided 
anywhere from just under $1,600 in appropriations per FTE all the way to $14,000 per FTE 
(SHEEO, 2012) and on the financial aid side of the funding picture, there were states that 
provide little to no financial aid all the way to $1,700 per FTE in the same academic year 
(NASSGAP, 2014).  Adding to the variation among the states in funding strategies is the 
expansion of performance-based funding programs, a specific subset of appropriations funding 
which can be found in more than half of the states as of December 2014 (Snyder, 2015b).  
Additionally, as mentioned above, states range anywhere from 30% to 73% in their public 
institution graduation rates (The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2015).  I suggest the need for an 
evaluation of any potential correlation between how a state funds higher education and how well 
institutions graduate students within that state.  That is, are states’ graduation rates better if 
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public investment is made via student financial aid or institutional appropriations? I seek to 
examine potential changes in graduation rates as states shift from one funding strategy to 
another. 
Considering the recent recession and present state of the economy in this country, it is 
likely unrealistic to expect huge or across-the-board increases in state funding for public higher 
education.  However, it does not mean that states cannot help to effect meaningful change via 
funding policy.  It would be highly beneficial to know if there is a specific funding strategy that 
seems to correlate with increased graduation rates and thus decreases in the total amount of 
tuition paid by students to obtain their degree or decreases in cumulative student debt burden 
upon leaving college.   
Importance of the Study 
With soaring Medicaid costs and increased competition for states’ finite fiscal resources 
(Titus, 2009), coupled with the fact that many state governments are legally and statutorily 
limited in how they can appropriate public resources (Archibald & Feldman, 2006), I suggest 
that students and other higher education stakeholders are not being helped by research that seems 
to be designed with the sole purpose of finding that more funds for public colleges and 
universities would be better.  More funds for any endeavor are always preferred, but the reality 
of limited fiscal resources is a concept that cannot be ignored.  Rather, I suggest a slightly more 
practical course of inquiry that seeks to examine the potential impact that a state might have by 
simply shifting existing support from one funding vehicle to another.  A greater understanding of 
the factors that impact graduation rates, such as state funding policy, can further add to the 
dialogue on this important topic.  In fact, there are four key areas in which the present study can 
augment the existing literature.   
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First, the present study will expand the examination of state higher education funding 
policy beyond the first-year indicator of retention, as has been the case in many prior studies on 
this topic.  That is, from the student level, higher education funding is a critical factor beyond 
just the first year of attending college.  Examining the long-term impact of state funding on 
graduation rates fits with the abovementioned justification for public support for higher 
education – to assist institutions in producing college graduates. 
Second, the present study will evaluate the use of each of the three funding vehicles 
rather than need-based financial aid vs. merit-based financial aid, or need-based aid vs. 
appropriations – which have been the focus of prior studies on the topic.  If every state uses at 
least two of the three funding vehicles (appropriations, need-based aid, and merit-based aid), 
then it makes more sense to examine appropriations and student financial aid rather than 
appropriations or student financial aid.   
Third, the present study moves up one level from institutional expenditures to include 
state-level variables in explaining differences in graduation rates across institutions.  As 
mentioned above, several studies have thoroughly examined graduation rates via student and 
institutional factors with an emphasis on institutional expenditures (Zhang, 2009; Ryan, 2004; 
Ehrenberg & Zhang, 2005; Hasbrouck, 1997), but these studies fail to account for state-level 
influence.  The present study is built upon several theoretical perspectives that will allow for a 
more comprehensive analysis of variation in graduation rates. 
And finally, by utilizing averaged longitudinal data as the covariates in the model, the 
present study provides an opportunity for a more complete picture than is generated by prior 
studies that used only a single year for covariate data. That is, six year averages of the predictor 
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variables capture more data about the cohort on which the six-year graduation rate statistic in 
IPEDS is based. 
Scope of the Study 
 Utilizing a multilevel model and national data, the present study seeks to examine the 
relationship between state funding policies and graduation rates.  More specifically, I plan to 
examine the potential impact of states’ varied funding policies including amount of student 
financial aid and amount of direct institutional appropriations on the key outcome indicator of 
institutions’ self-reported six-year graduation rates, after statistically controlling for known 
covariates at the institutional and state levels.  Additionally, in an effort to determine whether 
funding policies affect underrepresented minority groups differently than their white 
counterparts, I will extend the analysis to also evaluate the correlation between funding vehicles 
and minority student graduation rates.  Finally, I seek to determine if funding vehicles impact 
institutions with greater percentages of minority students differently than those with a less 
diverse student population.  
In order to achieve these research objectives of examining funding policy and graduation 
rates on a national scale, I will draw data from three primary sources:  Integrated Postsecondary 
Educational Data System, or IPEDS from the National Center for Education Statistics; the 
National Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs, or NASSGAP; and the Illinois 
State University Department of Education Grapevine data repository. Population, demographic, 
economic, and political data will also be drawn from the United States Census Bureau, the 
National Governors Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures; the Lumina 
Foundation, the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Education Commission of the States.  All of 
these data sources are available for public use.   
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Research Questions 
 The present study seeks to examine the following research questions: 
1. How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of institutional appropriations 
and student financial aid associated with six-year graduation rates at four-year, public 
institutions? 
2. How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of institutional appropriations 
and student financial aid associated with black and Hispanic student six-year graduation 
rates at four-year, public institutions? 
3. Does state public higher education funding via appropriations or financial aid affect 
institutions with greater proportions of minority students differently than institutions with 
lower proportions of minority students on the outcome of institutional graduation rates? 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
The following chapter includes seven topics that are critical in understanding the issue of 
state funding for higher education.  The first two sections focus on tuition and outline the change 
from low tuition/low aid models to high tuition/high aid models in public higher education; and 
how public tuition prices were impacted by the relative decreases in state fiscal support.  Next, 
stemming from increasing tuition, I will discuss how low graduation rates are contributing to the 
student loan debt issue in this country.  Subsequently, I will discuss two key areas that broadly 
impact higher education in order to describe the challenging policy arena in which higher 
education funding discussions exist: the effects of state funding strategies on access for 
disadvantaged, at-risk, or minority students; and the conceptualization of higher education as a 
public vs. a private good.  Then, for the purposes of building the proposed model for analyses, I 
will discuss studies that have identified significant predictors of state higher education funding as 
well as studies that have identified significant predictors of institutional graduation rates.  Upon 
identifying the limitations in the existing literature and describing how the present study will 
begin to help fill those gaps, I will outline the theoretical framework that will guide the present 
study. 
The changing balance between tuition and aid  
 Public colleges and universities have a variety of revenue streams, but there are three 
primary sources of funds: financial aid from federal and state loans and/or grants; appropriations 
from the state; and the remaining out-of-pocket tuition contributions from students and their 
families (Snyder, 2015b).  A unique subset of appropriations funding referred to as performance-
based or outcomes-based funding will be described in greater detail later in this chapter.  While 
the focus of this study is on the impact of state funding via financial aid and/or appropriations, it 
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is important to consider the role of tuition and how it impacts the higher education landscape and 
stakeholders. 
Cheslock and Hughes (2011) note in their comprehensive review of literature that states 
have always varied in their levels of support for colleges and universities, and these differences 
are still quite evident today.  Of particular note is that there are seemingly some characteristics 
that can predict a state’s investment in public higher education.  For example, during the early 
twentieth century, newer states that did not have the long-established private colleges and 
universities of the colonial states became the true leaders in public higher education (Goldin & 
Katz, 1999).  That is, these states were filling a gap in higher education within their state, and 
also greatly expanding college access for American citizens in the process.  And, not 
surprisingly, those younger states continue to invest more financial resources into public higher 
education per capita in the present day (Cheslock and Hughes, 2011).  During the 2011-2012 
academic year, for example, Nebraska and Wyoming provided $355 and $665 of per capita 
support for public higher education in the form of appropriations as compared to Massachusetts 
at $148 and Virginia at $209 (Grapevine, 2014). 
During the 20th century, in an effort to increase tuition revenue while also reducing the 
barriers for students of low socioeconomic status, institutions began replacing low tuition (and 
thus low aid) policies with equity-driven high tuition / high aid policies (Hearn & Longanecker, 
1985). High tuition / high aid policies are designed to have the tuition sticker price reflect the 
actual cost for providing the education to the student.  The actual price a student pays, or the net 
price, is a combination of financial aid / grants and the student’s ability to pay.  Proponents of 
high tuition / high aid policies emphasize the increased access for students from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds, while opponents state that public funds should subsidize across the 
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entire population rather than specific groups of students (Curs & Singell, 2010).  As a note, 
according to Heller (2001), it is important to consider the context in which this debate over high 
tuition / high aid and low tuition / low aid policy exists – one in which the public continues to 
question the public good aspects of higher education and in which students and families are 
expected to cover greater and greater shares of their education costs (referred to as privatization).  
Additional discussion about the conceptualization of higher education as a public versus private 
good as well as the privatization of higher education will be provided later in the literature 
review. 
Reduction in state funding and the corresponding increase in tuition 
The topic of state fiscal support for higher education is inextricably linked with the issue 
of tuition prices.  Prior to the early 20th century, tuition and fees at public colleges and 
universities were incredibly low, as support from the state greatly subsidized the cost of 
attending these institutions.  For example, it only cost approximately $80 per year to attend 
college prior to the start of World War II (Heller, 2002a), which would be approximately $1,300 
today when adjusting for inflation.  However, as states began to rely on market-driven policies in 
determining the allocation of limited financial resources, higher education saw a reduction in 
appropriations dollars from the states.  That is, the cost of attending public colleges and 
universities was not being subsidized at the same level by state governments via appropriations 
dollars. For example, after averaging all state funding for public higher education and adjusting 
for inflation, there was a 10.8% reduction in state financial support in just five years spanning 
from 2008 to 2013 (Grapevine, 2014). As operational costs for higher education institutions have 
increased, the relative proportion of state support as revenue in institutional budgets decreased, 
thereby increasing the relative percentage of other sources of revenue such as tuition and fees 
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(Wellman, 2008).  Thus, the reduction in state support for higher education can be thought of as 
a catalyst for increased tuition at public colleges and universities (Hiltonsmith, 2015).  
As a result of the reductions in the portion of institutional costs covered by state 
appropriations, tuition rose significantly during the 20th century (Massy, 2004), and the trend has 
continued into the 21st century as well.  In fact, the average undergraduate price of tuition and 
fees for non-profit, four-year institutions has increased by 82% in the past twenty years, and 33% 
in ten years alone when comparing figures adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2013b).  The figures are even worse for public colleges and 
universities; the institutions with historically lower tuition for students.  That is, over the twenty-
year period from 1993 to 2013, the average tuition price at four-year public institutions increased 
by a staggering 111%.  And the average price to attend a public college or university for the 
2012-2013 academic year was $8,070 – representing an increase of more than 57% from just ten 
years prior when adjusting for inflation (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013b). Short-
term impacts of tuition price increases may include the reduction or elimination of access for 
certain disadvantaged subsets of the population, and long-term impacts may include fewer 
degree completions, reduced intellectual capital, and an increase in student debt burden 
(Mulhern, Spies, Staiger, & Wu, 2015).  For certain, with steadily increasing tuition, there are 
obvious implications for a student’s ability to afford a college education (Oliff, Palacios, 
Johnson, & Leachman, 2013).  And because tuition prices have climbed at a rate faster than 
average family income (National Center for Public Policy & Higher Education, 2008), coupled 
with a shift in financial aid policy away from need-based grant funding in some states, there is a 
greater reliance on student loans and debt than ever before in this country (Zhan, 2014; Long & 
Riley, 2007). 
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Low graduation rates further compound the debt problem 
Tuition is an annual expense for students, and they will continue to make tuition 
payments until they graduate or until they drop out or stop out from their academic pursuits.  
While graduation is arguably the end goal for students, timely graduation is certainly the best 
outcome for the student from a financial perspective, as he or she would have to make fewer 
tuition payments or accrue less student loan debt to obtain a degree. However, according to the 
most recent IPEDS data on the cohort of full-time, first-time students beginning a public four-
year college or university in 2006, fewer than 35% of students graduated with a bachelor’s 
degree in four years, and just over 58% of students achieved a bachelor’s degree within six years 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2016). What is particularly problematic about this lengthening of 
time until graduation is that there is significant disparity in graduation rates between white 
students and minority students.  Four-year graduation rates for Hispanic and black students from 
the 2006 cohort were a dismal 24.8% and 18.6% respectively.  And while 61.4% of white 
students graduated with a bachelor’s degree within six years, the six-year graduation rates for 
Hispanic and black students were only 52.3% and 41.2% respectively, according to the 2008 
cohort data (U.S. Department of Education, 2016).  Chen & DesJardins (2010) found that 
underrepresented minority students (black and Hispanic students) were more likely to drop out 
before their second year of college than their white or Asian counterparts.  Considering that there 
is already well-known wealth inequality as well as wage and income disparity between whites 
and minorities in this country (Kochhar & Fry, 2014), it is even more troublesome that black and 
Hispanic students are disproportionately represented in the category of ‘college dropout’ as 
compared to their white peers. 
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Students are enrolling in a degree program and either dropping out before they reach 
graduation, or taking longer than six years to achieve what is traditionally considered a ‘four-
year degree.’ Either scenario is problematic from a student financial perspective, as it likely 
means one of two things:  students paid tuition or took loans to attend college but never achieved 
a degree, or students are taking more than six years to obtain a bachelor’s degree and therefore 
increasing the cost of their education.  It is worth mentioning that eight-year graduation rates are 
not substantially higher than six-year graduation rates, especially when considering the 
significant difference between four- and six-year graduation rates.  That is, the average 
graduation rates at public, four-year institutions for the 2000 cohort increased by 25.8% from 
four-year to six-year figures, but only 3.6% from six-year to eight-year figures (U.S. Department 
of Education, 2010).  What these figures suggest is that if a student has not yet graduated within 
six years, there is not much likelihood that he or she will ever persist to obtain a degree.  Thus, 
the key issue of concern is that too many students are dropping out of college before completing 
their degree. 
According to a report from the United States Department of Education, 22% of students 
who enrolled in a public four-year institution in the 2003-2004 cohort dropped out before 
completing their degree program, and averaged more than $9,300 in student loan debt (Wei & 
Horn, 2013).  However, the $9,300 figure does not take into account the cost of financing, and 
therefore understates the actual cost to the student to fully repay the debt.  For example, 
assuming a 6.8% interest rate and a ten-year repayment term, the total cost of the debt increases 
from $9,300 to $12,843, or 38%.  If it is challenging for students graduating with a bachelor’s 
degree and significant student loan debt to make their loan payments, imagine the student who 
did not even earn the degree or credential but who still walks away with debt obligations. 
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Gladieux and Perna found in their 2005 study that college dropouts were more than four times 
more likely than graduates to default on their student loans.  More recently, Akers (2014) found 
that the group at most risk of defaulting on their student loans were those with balances less than 
$5,000 but whom never graduated.  
Even though tuition is higher than ever, it is unlikely that student enrollments will 
decrease significantly because of the public belief that a college education is a necessity in 
today’s economy.  In a study conducted by Public Agenda for the National Center for Public 
Policy and Higher Education (Immerwahr & Johnson, 2009), more than 55% of survey 
respondents held the view that a college degree is a requirement for financial stability or success.  
The National Center for Education Statistics provided data in its 2014 annual report that seems to 
align with this concept that education is the key to obtain a job with a good salary.  In terms of 
annual salary for individuals between 25-34, young adults with at least a bachelor’s degree 
earned an average salary that was 57% higher than their peers without a degree or with only a 
high school diploma or equivalent high school completion credential.  This difference in salary 
would amount to more than $600,000 over the course of a lifetime (Braxton et al., 2009).  The 
divergence in groups is also evident on the indicator of employment/unemployment.  While 73% 
of the young adult population with a bachelor’s degree was employed fulltime in 2012, less than 
60% of high school completers held a fulltime position at that time (Kena et al, 2014).  With 
figures such as these, it is not surprising that individuals continue to enroll in colleges and 
universities even with lessening state support and increasing tuition.   
Further, given that demand for college education is up and the price to attend a college or 
university is increasing, it should not be surprising that student loan totals in this country are at 
record highs. According to a National Center for Education Statistics brief, students across the 
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1992-1993, 1999-2000, and 2007-2008 cohorts borrowed toward their postsecondary education 
at increasing rates of 49%, 64%, and 66% respectively (Woo, 2013).  In terms of the average 
cumulative student loan debt, each cohort borrowed more than the prior cohort from $15,000 in 
1992-1993, to $22,400 in 1999-2000, and $24,700 in 2007-2008. Each of these figures was 
adjusted to 2009 constant dollars for ease of comparison.  
Growing levels of cumulative student debt, coupled with a tough job market, have also 
resulted in problematic student loan default rates.  According to the U.S. Department of 
Education, the 3-year federal student loan default rate was 13.7% for students who graduated in 
2011 from all types of higher education institutions (Federal Student Aid, 2014).  For public 
four-year institutions, the default rate was lower at 8.9%, but that still means that nearly one in 
ten students defaulted on their student loan debt.  As another measure, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (2015) reported a student loan delinquency rate of 11.3% in the fourth quarter of 
2014.  This figure refers to the percentage of outstanding student debt that is currently at least 90 
days past due.  It is worth mentioning that, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: 
“delinquency rates for student loans are likely to understate actual delinquency rates because 
about half of these loans are currently in deferment, in grace periods or in forbearance and 
therefore temporarily not in the repayment cycle. This implies that among loans in the repayment 
cycle delinquency rates are roughly twice as high.”  Perhaps an even more troublesome picture is 
painted when considering that just because a loan is not delinquent does not necessarily mean 
that the individual is reducing the size of his or her loan principal.  In a recent post on the topic, 
Kelchen (2015) utilizes data from the United States Department of Education’s College 
Scorecard to evaluate cohort default rates and student repayment rates.  A key finding from the 
analysis is that more than 40% of students from the FY2011 cohort that entered repayment status 
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were current on their loans but had not reduced their loan principals in the first three years of 
repayment (Kelchen, 2015).  
Again considering the effects of tuition increases and debt reliance on different groups, it 
must be mentioned that minority students are more likely than their white counterparts to rely on 
student loans to attend college.  In particular, black students borrow at rates higher than whites or 
other minority groups (Jackson & Reynolds, 2013).  Only 19% of black students who graduated 
with a bachelor’s degree in 2008 did so without accruing student debt, as compared to 36% of 
white students in that academic year (Baum & Steele, 2010).  In addition to the obvious negative 
implications of large amounts of student loans and one’s ability to pay back the debt, taking out 
considerable debt can actually impact a student’s ability to successfully persist in college to 
obtain a degree.  For example, Gladieux & Perna (2005) found that black students were more 
likely than their white counterparts to drop out due to financial hardship or concerns.  Similarly, 
Ratcliffe & McKernan (2013) found that black students worry more about paying off their 
student loan debt than their white counterparts.  If debt is needed to attend college, but that very 
debt can negatively affect one’s chances of graduating, then what is left is a vicious cycle that 
leaves many underrepresented minorities with high student debt obligations and no degree or 
credential to show for it.   
Implications for access 
While the focus of this proposal is the effective use of public funds as measured by 
graduation rates, this literature review would be incomplete without a discussion of the key issue 
of access.  That is, researchers and policymakers must consider the implications of how various 
funding policies will affect a student’s ability to attend and afford college. 
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One area of research on state funding and access has been the evaluation of various 
funding vehicles and the impact on student access.  Specifically examining financial aid to 
students, researchers have studied the differences between need-based and merit-based financial 
aid programs and the corresponding impact on access for disadvantaged populations including 
minority students and students from low socioeconomic backgrounds (Ehrenberg, Zhang, & 
Levin, 2006; St. John, Paulsen, & Carter, 2005; Dynarski, 2002).  The results of such research 
overwhelmingly find that merit-based financial aid programs do not increase access for 
disadvantaged populations, and in fact may actually serve as a detriment to those students.  That 
is, funds spent on merit-based programs often pull resources away from need-based programs, 
and disadvantaged students are less likely to qualify for merit-based aid programs than their 
wealthier or white peers.  Dynarski (2002), for example, found that the enrollment gap between 
white students and minority students in Georgia significantly grew following the implementation 
of the merit-based HOPE program.  And by analyzing the recipients of the New Mexico Lottery 
Success Scholarship, Binder & Ganderton (2004) found that there were disproportionately fewer 
recipients from minority and/or low socioeconomic families.   
Through a comparative analysis of state funding strategies, researchers Toutkoushian and 
Shafiq (2010) utilized economic concepts to evaluate the choice of states to either support higher 
education via appropriations or need-based financial aid.  The findings suggest that additional 
funding for need-based financial aid programs has a greater effect on disadvantaged student 
access than appropriations-based funding structures. Again, this finding is in line with the 
literature discussed above that found that appropriations-based funding models use public 
resources to benefit all students within the state – even those without financial barriers to 
attending college.  While Toutkoushian and Shafiq’s work (2010) only analyzes appropriations 
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against need-based funding programs, the economic framework they utilized serves well in 
research on higher education funding policy.  
As mentioned above, it is not to say that merit-based financial aid programs do not 
achieve positive results such as increased enrollment in public institutions, keeping high 
performing students in-state following graduation, or increased prestige for flagship universities 
(Domina, 2014; Sioquist & Winters, 2014; Groen, 2011).  However, it is important not to forget 
that disadvantaged students are state residents too, and that any increases in the use of merit-
based programs can in effect be thought of as decreases in need-based programs by which 
disadvantaged students have shown to benefit. And beyond merit-based aid, Titus (2006) stated 
that operational strategies that rely heavily on tuition can again be especially detrimental to 
minority students and students from low socioeconomic backgrounds, as they do not have the 
same ability to pay as their peers from wealthier families. 
Higher education as a public vs. private good 
The way that higher education is conceptualized is a key element of the state higher 
education funding discussion because it demonstrates that not all taxpaying members of the 
United States see higher education in the same way.  Hensley, Galilee-Belfer, and Lee (2013), 
for example, evaluated public discourse on higher education in Arizona and noted a shift in 
emphasis from collective public good to the individual benefits of higher education.  The authors 
note that this shift aligns with changes in funding sources as well. Another key example, spurred 
by what she describes as a contentious and polarized debate on higher education funding, Dar 
(2012) examined the topic in the context of higher education being perceived as both a public 
and a private good. After reviewing the relevant literature, Dar then proposed a theoretical 
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framework built on spatial models of politics through which the political nature of higher 
education policy can be better understood.  
It is important to mention the inclusion of the public vs. private good discussion in higher 
education.  This notion is critical to the current and any future examination on public higher 
education funding, as it cannot be taken for granted that public higher education is viewed in a 
variety of ways depending on the subjective lens of the individual.  The dialogue on state 
funding for higher education exists among stakeholders and taxpayers that range anywhere from 
those believing in the public benefit of education and that the state should provide more support 
for public colleges and universities, to those who believe that a college education primarily 
benefits the private individual and therefore the costs associated with attending college should 
fall with students and their families.   
As mentioned earlier, it does not serve students or other higher education stakeholders 
well if the only proposed option for higher education funding is ‘more, more, more.’  Rather, 
education advocates and scholars would perhaps make more progress by framing the problems 
and any potential solutions in a way that respects the fact that not all taxpayers agree with 
throwing more money at what many see as a private good (and thus a private responsibility to 
cover the cost of the good).  The present study seeks to contribute to the higher education 
funding dialogue in a productive way by evaluating whether or not the method or vehicle of 
funding makes an impact on graduation rates. 
Predictors of state funding levels for public higher education 
There is a body of research that examines the political factors that influence the amount 
and type of state support of higher education. Such a line of inquiry is natural in this arena as 
state support for higher education is funded through public tax revenue – clearly an issue that can 
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be considered political in nature. Some of the key predictors for the amount and type of state 
support include economic conditions within the state; the political party in power in the 
legislature and in the role of governor; and prior commitment to higher education investment by 
the administration (Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Weerts & Ronca, 2012; Tandberg, 2010a). In 
assessing the current literature on the topic, I have summarized four key areas of study that are 
relevant to the discussion on state funding for higher education:  political climate in the state; 
type and strength of governance structures at the state level; specific economic factors that 
impact the state’s economy; and the utilization of performance-based funding programs.  In each 
of these sections, I will identify the key variables that have been found to impact state funding 
for higher education.  These variables will serve as control variables in the present study’s 
model. 
Political climate 
There has been prior research on the impact of political parties and partisanship on higher 
education funding.  Perhaps not surprisingly, many studies have found that the presence of a 
Democratic governor or a legislature with a Democratic majority positively affects the amount of 
higher education funding provided by the state (Ness & Tandberg, 2013; McLendon, Hearn, & 
Mohker, 2009; Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Rizzo, 2007).  Yet, other studies mention an 
increased competition from other Democratic party priorities such as K-12 education can 
actually lead to a negative relationship between Democratic party majority and higher education 
funding (Dar & Lee, 2014; Okunade, 2004).  Regardless, by focusing so heavily on political 
party, this type of evaluation can perhaps oversimplify the political impact on higher education 
funding (Tandberg, 2010b).  As the political arena in which decisions around state funding for 
higher education exists is multifaceted, one must consider other factors that impact the level of 
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state funding.  That is, while political party is certainly a contributing variable in state policy 
decisions, the members who make up these parties are not homogeneous in their priorities, 
preferences, and approaches toward funding policy.  Dar and Lee (2014), for example, find that 
the positive relationship between Democratic Party majority and/or strength and the levels of 
state funding for higher education is reduced as political polarization increases. This finding is 
not surprising as it is difficult to advance a particular policy agenda if the two political sides 
cannot ‘reach across the aisle.’  Both political party of the governor and the majority of the 
legislature will be included in the proposed model in order to capture the effect of partisanship 
on funding policy. 
Additionally, Tandberg (2009) expands on the notion that the complexity of political 
climate must be addressed in policy research, and offers a framework that can be used to assess 
the relationship between a variety of factors and the state’s resulting relative support of higher 
education.  This type of model is robust in that it includes such factors as economic indicators, 
other state spending priorities, political party in office, other political factors, as well as the 
prevalence or not of special interest or lobbying groups.  While the use of such a model is 
outside the scope of this study, considering all of these contributing variables together in a 
comprehensive model, rather than as separate individual factors such as Democrat or Republican 
as has been done in prior research, prevents an oversimplification of political issues in higher 
education.  
Governance structure and state higher education systems 
The type and strength of state-level governance structures can have also have an impact 
on higher education funding (Tandberg, 2013; McLendon, Hearn & Deaton, 2006).  In fact, 
several studies have examined this specific relationship between coordinating and governing 
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boards and the amount and type of state funding for higher education (Tandberg & Ness, 2011; 
Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg, 2010a; McLendon, Hearn & Mokher, 2009).  Tandberg (2010a) 
found that consolidated governing boards had a negative impact on state support for higher 
education as measured by the higher education expenditure per $1,000 of personal income in the 
state.  Similarly, expanding the evaluation to determine the difference between state funding 
levels for appropriations and for capital projects, Tandberg (2010b) found that consolidated 
governing boards were negatively related to state funding levels, with particular mention of the 
greater negative impact on capital funds from the state.  These negative relationships can perhaps 
be attributed to the fact that consolidated governing boards in effect isolate the decision makers 
from those who might otherwise support increased levels of funding for higher education 
(Tandberg, 2013).  Certainly the presence of governing boards impacts how states determine 
funding policy for higher education, and this variable will be controlled for in the present study. 
Although not a governance structure, the presence and size of private institutions within a 
state can impact the amount and type of funding for public higher education. Of particular note is 
a specific study conducted by Doyle (2012).  In a longitudinal study using 15 years of national 
data from 47 different states, Doyle examines the political factors that impact the level of tuition 
and financial aid at the state level in the United States.  He found significant results relating to 
his hypothesis that it is a combination of private higher education institutional influence and 
political preferences of elected officials that most impact public higher education funding.  That 
is, as governments become more liberal and as private college and university enrollments grow, 
the tuition at public institutions will decrease.  Viewing higher education systems and institutions 
through an economics lens, private and public colleges and universities can be seen as operating 
in the same line of business and, in effect, competing for the same students. Therefore, Doyle 
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tested the hypothesis that the size of private institutional enrollment will affect the tuition prices 
at public colleges and universities within the state (Doyle, 2012).  The examination of how 
private college and university enrollment could impact funding policy and tuition setting for 
public institutions was not thoroughly investigated prior to Doyle’s work, but does suggest the 
need for consideration of this variable in future models investigating public higher education 
funding, and will be controlled for in the proposed model.   
Economic factors 
The state of the economy will certainly have an impact on how and at what levels a state 
will fund higher education.  State budgetary commitments such as pensions, healthcare, and 
Medicaid are cited as having a negative impact on state funding for higher education (Delaney & 
Doyle, 2007; Okunade, 2004; Kena et al., 2003).  The same negative relationship has been found 
between spending on K-12 education and funding for higher education (Toutkoushian & Hollis, 
1998).  Again, it is important to remember that many taxpayers see colleges and universities as 
having the ability to fund their own operations through the collection of tuition; something that 
public K-12 education does not have.   
Additionally, unemployment is a key factor to consider as it impacts both sides of a 
state’s income statement (Rizzo, 2007; McLendon, Hearn, & Mohker, 2009) – fewer tax dollars 
from income tax of those individuals, and also increased spending on unemployment benefits.  
Dar and Lee (2014) even found that increasing unemployment rates significantly lessened the 
assumed positive relationship between Democratic party strength within a state governorship and 
legislature and state funding levels.  These findings line up with the findings of the studies 
discussed in the political party and section above, and underscore the importance of considering 
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the economic climate within a state, as these factors have far-reaching implications in state 
funding policy decisions. 
Finally, continuing the examination of state-level contexts, Delaney and Doyle (2011) 
tested the balance wheel model that posits that higher education funding will increase during 
good economic times, and also be funded at higher rates than other discretionary areas in state 
budgets (with the reverse being true when economic conditions worsen).  Key model and control 
variables included: total college enrollment in the state; unemployment rate; per capita income; 
political party of the state legislature; voter participation in presidential elections as a means to 
measure civic engagement of residents; and the type of governance structure for higher education 
in the state.   
Funding models tied to outcomes 
When appropriations funding is provided to colleges and universities to incentivize some 
desired outcome, it is called performance-based funding.  In higher education, one of the most 
obvious desired outcomes is persistence to degree completion.  That is, graduates are needed to 
ensure that states reap the public benefits of higher education such as increased intellectual 
capital and proper workforce development.  The underlying assumption to a performance-based 
funding program is that the financial incentive will encourage institutions to adjust their business 
practices in order to achieve the desired/specified goal.  This notion is consistent with the 
principal-agent theory (Jones, 2003; Hossler et al, 1997) in that institutions can be seen as agents 
of the states, with institutional behavior being influenced by state policy. Stemming from 
microeconomic theory, principal-agent models explain the economic transactions that occur 
when individuals interact with institutions (Williamson, 1975; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  For the purposes of this study, the state can be thought of as the 
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principal, and the institutions within those states can be thought of as the agents.  In this sense, 
the agents are contracted by the principals to provide the service to individuals within the state.  
Like the principal-agent model, Williams (1995) offered a dynamic model that finds that over 
time the state is actually able to affect outcomes within higher education institutions by means of 
funding policy (appropriations and financial aid).  More recently, Titus (2009) utilized his own 
interpretation of the principal-agent model for his dynamic analysis of state funding policy and 
graduation outcomes.  
As a brief history of performance-based funding in higher education, there are three key 
waves commonly known as PBF 1.0, PBF 2.0 (Dougherty et al, 2014), and the most recent OBF, 
or outcomes-based funding (Snyder, 2015b).  PBF 1.0 including funding models that offered an 
additional bonus to institutions to incentivize a desired outcome as identified by the state.  These 
funds were over and above the traditional base funding received by institutions from the state.  
PBF 2.0, on the other hand, actually utilized institutional performance on specific indicators in 
the calculation of funding from the state.  That is, this type of funding was designed to improve 
institutional outcomes by making a larger proportion of state funding reliant on institutional 
performance.  A key benefit of this type of funding model is that it was more difficult to drop 
these programs during budgetary shortfalls, as they were not separate line items outside of the 
overall state higher education funding formula (Dougherty et al, 2014). As of September 2013, 
22 states were employing some type of performance-based funding program while 17 more 
states were either in the process of transitioning into a performance-based funding model or were 
engaging in formal discussions about doing so (Friedel, Thornton, D’Amico, & Katsinas, 2013).  
As of July of 2015, 32 states currently utilize some type of performance-based funding while five 
more states are in transition (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015).  The newest wave 
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of outcomes-based funding, or OBF, is more refined than prior PBF models in that it is much 
more aligned with overall state goals on student success and college attainment levels.  Building 
on PBF 2.0, OBF models direct some percentage of the general allocation toward improving 
institutional outcomes on identified metrics and goals. As of December 2014, ten states are 
developing OBF policies while 25 states are implementing some type of OBF program for higher 
education funding (Snyder, 2015b).  It is important to mention that while the number of OBF 
programs is growing, it does not necessarily mean that the relative percentage of state funding 
for these programs is increasing.  Only five states align more than 50% of appropriations funding 
to their OBF formulas, with the rest tying less than 10% of funds to OBF (Fain, 2015). 
Some recent research has found positive results when testing the effectiveness of 
performance-based funding strategies in adjusting institutional behavior to align to the state’s 
desired goal.  Rabovsky (2012), for example, found that performance-based funding policy 
positively impacts institutional allocation of funds for instruction – a known driver of student 
success.  Dougherty and Reddy (2011) found that performance-based funding impacts 
institutional planning efforts around student academic and support services.  These two findings 
on institutional response to performance-based funding are likely not surprising, as institutions 
must ensure that students are receiving the instruction and support necessary to persist and 
ultimately graduate.  The findings that performance-based funding policy impacts institutional 
planning processes and fund allocations suggest the strength of the policy.  However, these 
studies alone do not address whether performance-based funding models actually achieve their 
intended purpose of increased institutional productivity, increased degree completions, and/or 
increased graduation rates at public institutions.   
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Contrary to these results, additional research has found there to be no connection between 
performance funding models and improved institutional outcomes such as productivity, degree 
completion rates, or six-year graduation rates.  Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross (2014), for 
example, examined the effect of a new performance-based funding policy on institutional 
productivity and degree completion rates in the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education.  
The team ultimately concluded that the PBF policy did not significantly or systematically affect 
the rates of degree completion within the state.  Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar (2015) found 
similar negative results when examining impact of OBF on both retention and completion rates 
at community colleges in the state of Washington.  Additionally, Sanford and Hunter (2011) 
examined Tennessee’s performance-based appropriations funding model that links six-year 
graduation rates at public higher education institutions with state fiscal support.  The results of 
the fifteen-year study found no improvement on retention or graduation rates under the 
performance funding structure, even when the financial appropriation incentives were doubled 
during one academic year by the state administration.  Shin (2010) reported similar findings 
when examining the issue of performance-based funding using longitudinal national data.  The 
ten-year study utilized data from 1997-2007 and found no significant improvement in 
institutional graduation rates in states that adopted some form of performance-based funding 
incentive over the course of that timeframe as compared to states without similar performance-
based funding policies.  Tandberg, Hillman, and Barakat (2014) reported similar findings when 
evaluating the graduation rates at community colleges in states with performance-based funding 
policies as compared to states without.  Nisar (2015) suggests that it is the incredibly complex 
nature of the higher education system that has prevented performance-based funding 
mechanisms from accomplishing their goals.  
 	 36	
Some educational researchers have discussed or in some instances even lamented the use 
of performance-based funding policies, primarily because they change the way in which higher 
education is conceptualized as an entity.  As an example, McKeown-Moak (2013) sums up her 
perception on the change in the approach toward accountability by describing the shift from a 
focus on higher education institutions toward a focus on the state and its economy.  This shift in 
policymaking and funding priorities toward satisfying taxpayers has serious implications for 
higher education research by requiring measurements of institutional quality and outcomes 
assessment, and then ultimately tying funding to performance on those measures.  But even 
taking a step back, other scholars have studied the underlying assumption to performance-based 
funding policies that colleges and universities are viewed as economic players rather than 
societal organizations.  Suspitsyna (2012) evaluated the prominent current research and discourse 
at the United States Department of Education, and concluded that: “the contemporary discourse 
on higher education tends to give more prominence to universities’ participation in the economy 
than to their role in society” (p. 50).  I mention these particular studies because it is critical to 
understand how scholars, policymakers, and the public view higher education in order to 
evaluate, assess, or inform future educational funding policy.  That is, it is likely futile for 
institutions to ignore their impact on state economies or to expect increased funding because of 
the public good they provide.  Rather, higher education discourse should occur recognizing that 
many stakeholders do not first view colleges and universities as institutions that exist for societal 
good, but as the educational “businesses” that produce qualified graduates for the workforce.  
And, as is prevalent in discussions in the private sector, accountability is a priority in educational 
policy, especially as public colleges and universities accept public funds. 
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There is a power balance struggle in public higher education between colleges and 
universities expecting autonomy to operate in the best way they see fit to achieve the goals of the 
institution, and state governments demanding accountability on behalf of the state’s taxpaying 
citizens and often pressuring institutions to keep tuition and tuition increases low (Conner & 
Rabovsky, 2011; Lane, 2007).  Considering the economic environment and privatization of 
higher education described earlier, it is probably unlikely that performance-based funding will be 
going away in public higher education in this country any time soon.  That is, demands for 
accountability measures are likely to persist, especially in a sector that accepts public funds to 
achieve its mission.   
Predictors of institutional graduation rates and other similar outcomes 
The proposed model is built with variables at the student, institution, and state levels, as 
informed by prior research. In the prior section, I identified key variables that predict the amount 
and type of state funding for higher education.  Below, I will outline some key studies that 
identified relevant variables that have been found to significantly predict education outcomes 
such as graduation rates or persistence rates. First, I will identify studies that evaluated various 
student and institutional level variables.  I group these two together as the unit of measurement 
for the present study is at the institutional level, and thus all student data will be aggregated to 
the institutional level for analyses. Then, I will discuss studies that have added in a state-level 
context to the examination of graduation rates.  Variables identified in this section will serve as 
control variables in the proposed models. 
Student and institutional levels 
Perhaps most basic to the evaluation of graduation rates is the idea that student 
characteristics impact graduation rates.  Zhang (2009) utilized fixed-effects and random-effects 
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models to measure the impact of the amount of state appropriations on institutional graduation 
rates in a longitudinal study that examined the cohort of students that began in the Fall of 1998 
until 2004.  Pertinent control variables in the model included: average age of freshman class; 
percentage of in-state students in freshman class; percentage of minority students in the freshman 
class; percentage of male students; and the SAT scores at the 25th and 75th percentile.  Like the 
present study’s model, these variables may be aggregated to the institutional level but serve as 
descriptors of the specific student body within the institution.  The results of Zhang’s study 
found that while it is small, there is a positive relationship between state appropriations and 
graduation rates based on the model in the study.  “When other factors are held constant, a 10% 
increase in state appropriations per full-time equivalent (FTE) student at 4-year public 
institutions is associated with approximately a 0.64 percentage point increase in graduation 
rates” (Zhang, 2009, p. 714). 
By utilizing longitudinal, hierarchical national data, Chen (2012) evaluated the 
relationship of a variety of predictors on a student’s risk for dropping out.  While the dependent 
variable in Chen’s study is dropout rather than graduation rate as is the case with the present 
study, the findings are still pertinent as the study was built upon organizational theory where 
institutions were expected to behave differently given different inputs.  After controlling for 
several student- and institutional-level variables, results from the study found several student-
level variables were significant in predicting student dropout risk: academic preparation as 
measured by high school GPA; college experience; educational aspirations; GPA in freshman 
year; academic and social integration; and amount of financial aid received.  Many of these 
student level variables will not be included in the present model as the unit of analysis is the 
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institution, and such indicators as educational aspiration and social integration cannot be 
aggregated to the institutional level. 	 Kelly and Jones (2005) examined the relationship between state funding and institutional 
performance on such indicators as graduation rates, participation rates, degree production, and 
research production.  Utilizing metrics on these four areas of performance, the team generated 
performance scores for each of the fifty states on each of the performance areas, and 
subsequently calculated performance-to-funding ratios based on the varied levels of state funding 
across the country.  (A note of clarification: performance-to-funding ratios are not referring to 
performance-based funding.)  As the present study is focused on graduation rates, it is worth 
noting that Kelly and Jones found a weak correlation between graduation rates and funding in 
their single cross-sectional study.  However, an additional piece of analysis in the study included 
a series of correlations to determine the statistical relationship of external variables to the 
performance-to-funding ratios calculated earlier.  Three key student variables were identified by 
Kelly and Jones as being related to performance: SAT/ACT scores for entering freshmen; 
percentage of minority freshmen students; and percentage of out-of-state students in the 
freshman class.  Webber and Ehrenberg (2010) and Scott, Bailey, and Kienzl (2006) reported 
similar findings, but also added gender as a key predictor; with greater percentages of female 
students resulting in greater retention and graduation rates. 
 Morrison (2013) evaluated the influence of various institutional-level predictors on the 
outcome of graduation.  Like prior studies, Morrison found that there are several variables that 
serve as strong predictors of graduation rates:  the percentage of students receiving Pell grants 
(negative relationship) and average student SAT/ACT scores (positive relationship).  Heck, Lam, 
and Thomas (2014) found the percentage of minority students; and the percentage of students 
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receiving federal financial aid to be significant predictors of graduation rates.  Other research has 
consistently found the same negative relationship between minority student status or Pell grant 
recipient status and retention rates and graduation rates (Pike, 2013; Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010; 
Ryan, 2004). 
As students are nested within different colleges and universities, one must consider the 
impact of various institutional characteristics on graduation rates.  Hamrick, Schuh, and Shelley 
(2004) evaluated the predictive power of various institutional characteristics on graduation rates 
by utilizing multiple regression, independent bivariate regression, and hierarchical models, with 
data from four-year public institutions from all fifty states.  The team found, “the variables 
contributing to a prediction of higher graduation rates were: higher status within the Carnegie 
classification system; the presence of a medical, dental, or veterinary program; a more urbanized 
location; and a lower percentage of applicants admitted” (Hamrick, Schuh, and Shelley, 2004, p. 
16).  While the presence of a medical, dental, or veterinary program was found to be significant 
in Hamrick et al’s model, this variable was not found in the literature on graduation rates since 
the study was published, and thus will not be included in the proposed model. 
From the institutional expenditure side, several studies have examined the impact of 
different variables on graduation or persistence rates.  Webber and Ehrenberg (2010), for 
example, utilized econometric modeling techniques to evaluate the impact of institutional 
expenditures on academic support, research, and student services on institutional graduation rates 
and first-year retention rates.  Through the longitudinal study, the team found that expenditures 
on student services is significantly and positively related to graduation rates and first-year 
retention rates.  Similarly, Chen (2012) found that expenditures on student services were 
significantly related to dropout risk while expenditures on academic support and instruction were 
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not.  Contrary to these results, Gansmer-Topf and Schuh (2006) and Ryan (2004) found that 
instruction and academic support expenditures were significantly related to retention at four-year 
institutions.  And finally, Morrison (2013) identified expenditures per FTE student as a key 
variable that also predicts graduation rates, but with smaller effects than the student-level 
variables mentioned above. 
Heck, Lam, and Thomas (2014) had a slightly different approach toward defining 
“funding.”  Whereas other studies focus either on state appropriations and/or student financial 
aid, Heck et al also included the student contribution toward tuition and fees, or net tuition, as 
part of their funding variable. Their study evaluated the impact of changes in appropriations and 
student contribution on graduation rates, after controlling for institution-level and state-level 
variables including: the ratio of net tuition to total revenue for public higher education within the 
state; political culture as defined by Elazar’s Typology (a model used to describe three different 
types of political culture); percentage of recent high school graduates in the state currently 
enrolled in college; per capita income; unemployment rate; and the average first-year retention 
rate; 25th and 75th percentile on SAT/ACT; Carnegie classification; percentage of fulltime 
faculty; percentage of minority students in freshman class; institutional tuition for in-state 
students; and the percentage of students receiving federal financial aid via Pell grants; and 
institutional expenditures.  Not unlike prior studies, Heck et al identified the following 
institutional-level variables as significantly predicting graduation rate variation: Carnegie 
classification; selectivity as measured by SAT/ACT scores; percentage of fulltime faculty; 
tuition and fees; and first year retention rate. 
One other key institutional-level predictor of graduation rates is that of institutional size 
as measured by enrollment.  Morrison (2013), Ryan (2004), and Pike (2013) all found that four-
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year institutions with larger enrollments reported having greater retention rates as well as 
graduation rates. 
State level 
Hypothesizing that it is a combination of student, institutional, and state-level variables 
that impact such outcomes as graduation rates, Titus (2006) combined student-level data from 
the Beginning Postsecondary Survey (BPS:96/01), institutional-level IPEDS data, and state-level 
data on state higher education funding to evaluate any potential influence of various predictors 
on institutional graduation rates across a sample spanning 49 states.  Consistent with prior 
research, Titus found several student-level predictors of graduation rates including variables 
pertaining to student demographics, student academic preparation, student engagement, and 
unmet need as it pertains to tuition and fees; and a key institutional level predictor as the 
percentage of revenue from tuition.  Most pertinent to the present study were the findings from 
the state level, including the positive relationships between graduation rates and both the amount 
of funding as financial aid versus appropriations, and the amount of financial aid funding as 
need-based funding.  Two additional findings were that an increased market-driven reliance on 
tuition is positively related to institutional graduation rates; and that percentage of state aid in the 
form of student financial aid – rather than direct appropriations - is positively related to 
graduation rates.  These two findings make intuitive sense when considered together.  That is, 
colleges and universities will likely do a better job of retaining students if the institutions are 
more heavily reliant on tuition as a revenue source. The proposed model is predominately 
interested in the impact of these funding vehicles on graduation rates, but will also control for 
this known predictor variable of tuition reliance.  As a note, the majority of the student-level 
predictor variables identified in Titus’ study will not be included in the proposed model as the 
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unit of investigation is the institution, and thus will only include student-level variables that can 
be aggregated to the institutional level.   
Chen & St. John (2011) expanded prior examination of state-level impact on student 
persistence by creating a three-level hierarchical model based on their own comprehensive 
theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of state-level financial aid on student persistence 
rates.  The team was interested in comparing merit- and need-based financial aid, and also in the 
coordination of public institution tuition with need-based financial aid. Utilizing data from the 
beginning Postsecondary Survey (BPS:96/01), Chen and St. John assessed the impact of a state’s 
usage of merit-based financial aid or need-based financial aid on the likelihood of a student 
persisting to degree completion at their first institution after controlling for student- and 
institutional-level variables.  One key significant variable of interest at the state-level was the 
ratio of state need-based financial aid to tuition at public institutions.  At the state level, the team 
found that this ratio was positively related to persistence rates.  That is, “a one percent increase 
in the ratio of state need-based aid to tuition is related to a 2% increase in the odds of 
persistence” (p. 653).  Again, while many of the student-level predictors in this study will not be 
included in the proposed model due to an inability to aggregate to the institutional level, public 
institution tuition is an important Level 2 variable for consideration. 
Finally, continuing with the examination of state-level impact on educational outcomes, 
Kelly and Jones (2005) and Heck, Lam, and Thomas (2014) also found income per capita to 
significantly predict graduation rates at public colleges and universities in a given state.  Per 
capita income warrants special mention as it has been found to be predictive both of funding 
levels (Delaney & Doyle, 2011) as well as institutional graduation rates (Kelly & Jones, 2005; 
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Heck, Lam, & Thomas, 2014).  As such, per capita income will be included in the proposed 
model as a Level 2 predictor. 
Gaps in the Literature 
I offer the following discussion on three perceived limitations or gaps in the existing 
literature: the use of only first-year indicators or single-year studies on the topic of state funding 
for public higher education; an oversimplification of political climate to the variable of political 
party in power; and the use of mutually-exclusive funding vehicles in studies examining funding 
policy. 
First-year indicators and single year studies 
While the body of literature on the impact of funding policy on access is quite robust, a 
public issue like state funding for higher education is one that requires additional evaluation 
using different outcomes such as graduation rates.  As state funding for institutions and students 
will continue year over year in some form, it calls for an evaluation of the effectiveness in which 
that funding is reaching the desired outcome; in this case, graduation.  Studies looking only at 
first-year retention rather than graduation rates fail to capture the multi-year impact of state 
funding. 
Along the same lines, studies that evaluate a single year of funding against an outcome 
such as graduation ignore the fact that policy has both short-term and long-term effects.  
Evaluating how well students graduated within a single year under that year’s funding policy 
would fail to capture the other factors that could have impacted the outcomes in that year such as 
prior year’s funding or recent changes in policy.  Utilizing data from all six years of a cohort 
helps to address these concerns. 
Overreliance on party in political studies 
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 Examining the political factors that impact funding for public higher education makes 
sense in that public funds are being used, and thus clearly a political issue.  However, there have 
been studies with the sole purpose of evaluating whether one political party funds public higher 
education at greater rates than another.  This type of knowledge is helpful if the relationship 
between party and funding is used to inform future models, but I suggest that it does very little if 
the end goal is just finding that Democratic legislators and governors fund higher education at 
greater levels than Republicans, or vice versa.  Like several recent studies that have utilized 
comprehensive political and economic models to evaluate higher education policy, the present 
study will include variables reflecting the political and economic climate in the states within the 
model in order to capture the influence of politics on the issue of state funding.  Key variables in 
addition to the political party of the governor and legislative majority, as identified through the 
existing literature discussed above, would include: the presence and strength of a governing 
board; unemployment data; and the fiscal health of the state. 
Mutually exclusive funding vehicles 
 As mentioned earlier, the present study will evaluate the use of each of the three funding 
vehicles rather than comparing the use of two vehicles in a state’s funding policy.  If every state 
uses at least two of the three funding vehicles (institutional appropriations, need-based aid, and 
merit-based aid), then it makes more sense to evaluate the relationship between each of the 
vehicles and graduation rates.  This line of inquiry is appropriate considering the assumption that 
funding increases are unlikely from the states but that policy changes can still have an impact on 
institutions and outcomes. 
 Additionally, the present study is constructed on the notion that perhaps more funding is 
not the only way for a state to encourage better performance by its higher education institutions.  
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That is, unlike prior studies that examine the impact of increases or decreases in total funding 
dollars, the present study will evaluate the potential impact that can be made by shifting funding 
from one type of vehicle to another.  As the present study is constructed through the lens of 
evaluating the effectiveness of state funding to ensure tax dollars are invested in higher education 
wisely, it will help steer the discussion away from ‘more and more and more is needed’ and 
toward a more realistic and practical conversation. 
Theoretical Framework 
A framework derived from three kinds of theories will guide this study: principal-agent 
models as they pertain to individual institutions operating within a state; persistence theories or 
college impact models for identifying the variables that must be considered when studying the 
student-driven outcome of graduation; and microeconomic theory as higher education does not 
exist in a vacuum but rather as a player in the local and state economies.   
First, and perhaps most basic to the expectation that institutions will behave differently 
(and thus have different outcomes) under different funding policies, is the principal-agent model 
as mentioned earlier in the chapter.  That is, institutions can be thought of as the agents of the 
state (principal) in that their organizational decision-making can largely be driven by the wills 
and priorities imposed on them by the state. 
Second, persistence theories and college impact theories can provide the foundation for 
examining institutional graduation rates and the factors that can impact those rates.  It can be 
helpful to consider the various levels of the higher education system that have an effect on 
outcomes – in this case, the three levels are primarily student, institutional, and state. The 
seminal works in the persistence and college impact arena are that of Tinto (1993), Astin (1993, 
1985), and Pascarella (1985).  These frameworks have social psychology and sociology 
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underpinnings (Terenzini & Reason, 2005), and thus focus primarily at the student level, or 
institutional-level variables that have a more direct impact on the student experience.  Adding in 
more at the institutional level, the college impact model developed by Berger and Milem (2000) 
finds that both student-level characteristics and institutional-level characteristics combine to 
impact such outcomes as graduation.  Building upon resource dependency theory where an 
institution’s response to changes in resources such as state funding can be thought of as 
organizational behavior (Pfeffer, 1997), the Berger and Milem model posits that persistence can 
be understood as a function of student demographics such as race/ethnicity, gender, 
socioeconomic status, and academic record; and institutional factors such as organizational size 
and control.  Terenzini & Reason (2005) proposed a similar model when examining specifically 
the first-year retention at colleges and universities, which finds that the student experience can be 
explained by the student’s precollege characteristics; the student’s fellow students as a peer 
group; the institution’s organizational structure; and the individual student’s personal 
experiences and interactions.  And a model from St. John (1992) also specifically included 
financial aid as a key element in understanding student persistence.  Expanding even further into 
the institutional level characteristics, other studies, such as that of Ryan (2004) and Kim, 
Rhoades, and Woodward (2003), contend that financial variables at the institutional level such as 
expenditures must also be included for a more thorough understanding of student persistence.  
Such a concept fits in well with organizational behavior frameworks that are built on the idea 
that the actions and functions of an institution can and do impact student outcomes such as 
graduation rates.  Adding in the state-level context, St. John (2006) subsequently included state 
funding policies as another layer in understanding and predicting student persistence.  This 
model also identifies student demographics and the level of student academic preparation for 
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college as variables that must be controlled for in understanding persistence in the context of 
state funding policies.  
Finally, other studies have added in additional state-level predictors beyond that of 
funding policy such as political variables, economic indicators in the state, and demographics of 
the state population (Titus, 2009; 2006; Dar & Lee, 2014; Shin & Milton, 2004; Delaney & 
Doyle, 2011).  A model developed by Titus (2006; 2009) includes measures of educational 
achievement among the state’s population; the number of public colleges and universities per 
capita; and the unemployment rate because each of these variables impact the higher education 
market as a whole.  This inclusion of macroeconomic environment measures is important for 
having a robust understanding of fiscal policy and the impact on persistence because institutions 
of higher education are subject to external economic influences. 
 The proposed model will include variables at both the principal and agent levels.  That is, 
the agent level will include pertinent predictor variables about students and institutions, while the 
principal level will include state-level funding variables and variables pertaining to the 
macroeconomic environment of the state.  Specific variables to be included in the model will be 
outlined in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
For the present study, I utilized a multilevel quantitative research approach to evaluate 
the relationship between state higher education funding vehicles of appropriations, need-based 
student financial aid, and/or merit-based student financial aid and six-year institutional 
graduation rates.  Specifically, I employed hierarchical linear modeling, or HLM, to fit models 
with predictor variables at both the institution and state levels in order to examine the impact of 
state funding vehicles on the outcome of graduation rates.   
Guided by a proposed theoretical framework constructed through the combination of 
principal-agent theory (Williamson, 1975; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; 
Williams, 1995; Titus, 2009), persistence theories and college impact models (Berger & Milem, 
2000; Pfeffer, 1997), and microeconomic theory as it pertains to higher education (St. John, 1992 
& 2006; Titus, 2006 & 2009), I utilized data from the institutional level as well as data reflecting 
the state’s political and economic environments to determine if there is an association between 
state funding policy and institutional graduation rates.  By utilizing data at two levels 
(institutional- or ‘agent’-level data nested within state- or ‘principal’-level data) rather than a 
traditional single-level OLS regression approach, HLM allows for better estimation of agent-
level effects as it accounts for the fact that institutions are nested within states (principal-level) 
which share some set of common political and economic characteristics.  Additionally, by 
utilizing HLM, it is possible to distinguish between within-group and between-group variance in 
institutional graduation rates by partitioning the variance at these separate levels (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002).   Such an application is appropriate when dealing with public colleges and 
universities, which are institutions with varying degrees of autonomy that have to operate within 
the parameters of an overarching state fiscal policy arena and within the greater higher education 
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system in the United States.  Finally, HLM is better at handling uneven group sizes or even small 
group sizes that would otherwise be problematic in traditional OLS regression methods 
(Cheslock & Rios-Aguilar, 2011).  This was especially important for the present study as there 
were some states with as few as one or two public institutions, and other states with more than 
thirty. 
Data 
For the present study, I used national data from three primary sources: the National 
Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs (NASSGAP) for data on need-based and 
merit-based financial aid to students; the Illinois State University College of Education 
Grapevine, a compiler of data on state appropriations for public higher education; and the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) from the National Center for 
Education Statistics for data on graduation rates, institutional finance, student demographics, and 
other key predictor and control variables at the institutional level.  I drew additional data 
regarding state population and demographics from the United States Census Bureau.  The 
National Governors Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures served as the 
source of data on the political party affiliations of elected officials.  The United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics provided unemployment rate data by state. The Lumina Foundation, the National 
Conference of State Legislators, and several prior academic studies on the topic of state funding 
for higher education (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Hillman, Kelchen, & Goldrick-Rab, 2013; 
Gurbunov, 2013) provided the data for the binary measure of whether or not a given state was 
utilizing performance-based funding.  Finally, the Education Commission of the States provided 
data on the governance structure at the state level for public higher education.  All of the data 
sources were available for public use, and thus exempt from the Seton Hall University 
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institutional review board approval process.  Table 1 outlines the source, level of measurement, 
and code for each variable.  
 Table	1	-	Variables	by	source	for	the	proposed	model 
The primary outcome variable (GRADRATE), or institutional graduation rate, represents 
the percentage of full-time, first-time, degree-seeking undergraduate students graduating within 
150% of normal time to program completion. This IPEDS measurement is calculated based on a 
cohort of students, with institutions reporting the percentage of the cohort that have obtained a 
bachelor’s degree after six years.  Additionally, for the comparative research question, the 
LEVEL OF VARIABLE CODE
MEASUREMENT FOR SPSS
Graduation rate IPEDS Ratio 2012 GRADRATE
Black student graduation rate IPEDS Ratio 2012 BLACKGRADRATE
Hispanic student graduation rate IPEDS Ratio 2012 HISPGRADRATE
Level 1 Variables
% minority students IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 MINPERC
% female students IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 FEMALE
% Pell grant students IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 PELLPERC
SAT score 25th % IPEDS Interval 2007-2012 SAT25
SAT score 75th % IPEDS Interval 2007-2012 SAT75
% out-of-state students IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 OUTST
% of fulltime faculty IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 FTFAC
Carnegie Classification IPEDS Categorical 2012 CARNEGIE
FTE enrollment IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 FTE
In-state tuition & fees IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 TUITION
% revenue from tuition IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 REVTUITION
% expenditure on instruction IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 EXPINSTR
% expenditure on student services IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 EXPSS
Level 2 Variables
Appropriations per capita* ISU Grapevine Ratio 2007-2012 APPPC
Need-based financial aid per capita* NASSGAP Ratio 2007-2012 NEEDAID
Merit-based financial aid per capita* NASSGAP Ratio 2007-2012 MERITAID
Use of performance-based funding Lumina Fdn, NCSL Dichotomous Categorical** 2007-2012 PBF
Unemployment rate BLS Ratio 2007-2012 UNEMPLOY
Personal income per capita USCB Ratio 2007-2012 INCOME
% of population with bach. deg. USCB Ratio 2007-2012 POPBACHDEG
Political party of governor NGA Categorical** 2007-2012 GOVPARTY
Political party of legislative majority NCSL Categorical** 2007-2012 LEGMAJPARTY
Presence of consolidated gov. board ECS Dichotomous Categorical** 2007-2012 GOVBOARD
Private enrollment relative to public IPEDS Ratio 2007-2012 PRIVTOPUB
* represents a researcher-calculated figure based on data from United States Census Bureau 
** Categorical variables were dummy coded for inclusion in the model
Variables by Source for the Proposed Model
VARIABLE NAME SOURCE YEARS
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outcome variables also included the six-year graduation rate for black students 
(BLACKGRADRATE) as well as the six-year graduation rate for Hispanic students 
(HISPGRADRATE).   
In order to fully understand the economic and financial impact of low graduation rates, it 
is important to first mention what is included in the graduation rate statistic available through 
IPEDS.  According to the IPEDS data file documentation from the National Center for Education 
Statistics, the 150% of normal time graduation rate refers to the percentage of full-time, first-
time students that earn a bachelor’s degree within six years (National Center for Education 
Statistics, 2014, p. 35).  A noted limitation of the present study is that the IPEDS graduation rate 
variable reflects full-time, first-time students, which is certainly not representative of all students 
that attend public colleges and universities in the United States as many students attend part-time 
or transfer to another institution before completing their degree.  However, the present study is 
certainly representative of a majority of undergraduate students at four-year public institutions as 
full-time, first-time students represented more than 57% of all entering undergraduate students in 
the 2013 cohort at four-year public colleges and universities (National Center for Education 
Statistics, 2013a).  Additionally, many of the key persistence theories that guide the present 
study were first conceptualized by examining “traditional college students” as the population of 
interest, thus lending credibility to utilizing an outcome variable that measures graduation rates 
for full-time, first-time students rather than all students.  Simply measuring the number of 
graduates would not allow for an examination of length of time to degree completion for a 
specific cohort – a crucial component when considering the financial ramifications of attending 
college (i.e. tuition payments and/or student loans).  Additionally, the results of this study can be 
a starting point for future research that takes various student types into account including part-
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time students, adult learners or those that are not the traditional college age, and those returning 
to college to complete a degree or to obtain an additional degree. 
Level 1 control variables in the model represent predictors at the institutional level, and 
are related to demographics of the student body, institutional selectivity, institutional structure, 
and institutional finance.  Based on the literature review, specific student-level variables of 
interest include: the percentage of minority students at the institution; proportion of female 
students in the undergraduate student body; percentage of undergraduate students receiving Pell 
grants; percentage of out-of-state students; and combined Critical Reading and Mathematics 
SAT scores at the 25th and 75th percentiles, or ACT scores that were converted into relative SAT 
scores by using concordance tables from College Board (2009) in the event of missing SAT 
scores or if more students submitted ACT scores at that institution.  For the purposes of this two-
level model, all student-level data is aggregated to the institutional level.  Institutional-level 
variables include percentage of full-time faculty employed by the institution; Carnegie 
classification; organizational size in terms of full-time undergraduate student enrollment; and in-
state tuition and fees for public colleges and universities.  Financial variables include percentage 
of institutional revenue from tuition; percentage of institutional expenditures on instruction; and 
percentage of institutional expenditures on student services.   
Level 2 variables in the model represent predictors at the state level related to funding 
policy as well as the greater macroeconomic environment of the state. These variables measure 
many of the conditions and circumstances under which all public colleges and universities within 
the state are impacted.  Of particular interest in the present study were the three specific funding 
variables of appropriations per capita; need-based financial aid per capita; and merit-based 
financial aid per capita.  For the purposes of the present study, the appropriations and financial 
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aid variables were normalized based on U.S. Census Bureau data on the number of residents over 
the age of 18 within the state in order to determine a state’s level of spending on higher 
education for adults.  Additional control variables that relate to the overall state economic and 
political environments include the unemployment rate; personal income per capita; percentage of 
the state population with at least a bachelor’s degree; the political party of the state’s governor; 
the political majority in the state legislature; the presence or not of a consolidated governing 
board for higher education; the use of performance-based funding policy in the state; and the size 
of private institution undergraduate enrollment relative to public institution undergraduate 
enrollment within the state. 
A graphical depiction of the proposed Two-Level Principal-Agent Framework can be 
found below in Figure 1. 
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Due to the fact that graduation rates represent an outcome that is the function of prior 
years of influence, the Level 1 and Level 2 variables had to be matched with the appropriate 
graduation rate data.  That is, six-year graduation rate data for the 2012-2013 academic year, for 
example, represents the outcomes of students that enrolled first as freshmen in academic year 
2007.  Prior studies have utilized various strategies to deal with what is essentially a lag in 
effects from policy including using data from the year in which the six-year graduation rate was 
collected (Kelly & Jones, 2005); or using data from the years in which the respective cohort 
began its freshman year (Zhang, 2009; Ryan, 2004).  Either of these approaches can be 
State Macro 
Environment
State Funding 
Policies
Institutional 
Characteristics
Student 
Characteristics
Graduation Rate
Level 2
Level 1
•% minority students
•% female students
•% PELL grant recipients
•SAT scores at 25th & 75th %
•% out-of-state students
•% full-time faculty
•Carnegie Classification
•Organizational size 
•In-state tuition and fees
•% of revenues from tuition
•% of expenditures on:
•Instruction
•Student services
•Appropriations per capita
•Need-based aid per capita
•Merit-based aid per capita
•Use of PBF
•Unemployment rate
•Personal income per capita
•% population with at least 
a bachelor’s degree
•Governor party affiliation
•Legislative majority
•Presence of governing 
board
•Size of private enrollment 
relative to public
Proposed Two-Level Model
for the evaluation of graduation rates at public institutions
Figure 1 - Proposed model for the evaluation of graduation rates at public institutions (Adapted by Abbott, 2016) 
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problematic, however, as they do not capture influence across all years of the cohort.  As such, 
the present study utilized averages of the covariates as college enrollment is a multi-year 
endeavor, and student outcomes are certainly influenced by various financial, political, and 
economic factors over the course of those years and not just in the first or final year of college 
enrollment.  That is, the model variables in the present study that predict graduation rates in 2013 
were six-year averages of those predictors across the years 2007-2012.  For example, the Level 2 
variable of ‘Unemployment Rate’ reflects a straight-line average of state unemployment rate data 
from the years 2007-2012.   
Data Preparation 
As multiple data sources were utilized for the present study, there were a number of 
necessary steps that had to be taken prior to statistical analyses.  Beyond the obvious requisite 
coding and data clean-up, several of the variables required imputation, computation, or 
transformations before they could be used in the models. 
First, at Level 1, I converted ACT scores to their comparable equivalent SAT score as 
needed in order to provide an appropriate figure for use in the model, as most institutions accept 
both scores but students generally choose to submit either ACT or SAT scores. I chose to convert 
ACT to SAT rather than the other way around, because there were more missing cases of ACT 
than SAT.  However, if an institution had both SAT and ACT scores reported, I utilized the score 
for the test in which a greater proportion of students submitted scores.  That is, if an institution 
had both ACT and SAT scores, but more than 90% of students submitted ACT as opposed to 
only 20% for SAT, then I converted the ACT score to a comparable SAT score for use in the 
model.  I chose the ACT score in this example as that score serves as a better representation of 
the student class than the reported SAT score for only 20% of students.  College Board, a 
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nonprofit organization that administers the SAT, provided concordance tables that assisted with 
this conversion of standardized test scores (College Board, 2009). Additionally, only the 
combined SAT Critical Reading and Mathematics scores, or the converted ACT to SAT 
composite scores, were included in the study as not all students are required to take the writing 
test for the ACT.  Finally, colleges and universities with open admissions policies that did not 
report ACT or SAT data to IPEDS were assigned an imputed score of 850 at the 25th percentile 
and 1080 at the 75th percentile.  These figures were calculated by averaging the SAT scores (or 
converted ACT scores) at the 25th and 75th percentiles for colleges and universities with a 90% 
admit rate or greater.  SAT data was included in the model to account for the selectivity of each 
institution.  If a college or university has open admissions, then it is, by definition, not a highly 
selective institution; much like its peer institutions with greater than 90% admit rates.  By 
assigning imputed scores, rather than excluding these open admissions institutions, the sample 
size for the study was unaffected. 
Second, I coded the Carnegie classification as an ordered variable ranging from 1 to 4; 
with 1 representing a Baccalaureate institution, 2 representing a Master’s institution, 3 
representing a doctoral or research institution, and 4 representing a doctoral or research 
institution with very high research activity.  Other higher education studies have utilized an 
ordinal coding scheme for Carnegie classification rather than dummy coding variables (Sale & 
Sale, 2010; Owen, 2008; Miller, 2008) as the institutional groupings in the Carnegie 
classification do approximate an ordinal variable structure rather than a purely categorical value 
(Owen, 2008).   
Third, I prepared the Level 2 financial data by computing the per capita appropriations, 
need-based financial aid, and merit-based financial aid figures. In order to normalize the data, I 
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used data from NASSGAP, the Illinois State Grapevine, and the United States Census Bureau to 
calculate the per capita expenditure on student financial aid and institutional appropriations.  By 
converting the data to per capita numbers, it allowed for a more suitable comparison between 
states on appropriations and financial aid.  For the purposes of this study, the per capita 
calculation was based on the population over the age of 18 in the state in order to determine the 
amount of state expenditures per adult resident.   
Fourth, there were several Level 2 variables that are not tracked by IPEDS or NASSGAP, 
and therefore had to be collected and coded independently.  These variables included: presence 
or not of a consolidated governing board; the use of performance-based funding (PBF) in the 
state’s higher education funding policy; the political party of the governor; and the political party 
of the legislative majority.  Each of these variables are categorical, and were coded as 
dichotomous variables.  The presence or not of a consolidated governing board was captured as 
1=had a governing board and 0=did not have a governing board.  In terms of averaging across 
the six years of the cohort, states did not vary in whether or not they had a consolidated 
governing board so each state has either a 1 or a 0 as a value for this variable.  The use of 
performance-based funding was captured as 1=Had PBF, and 0=Did not have PBF.  States had 
either a 1 or a 0 as a value, with a 1 reflecting that the state had, at some point over the six years, 
some type of performance-based funding program for public four-year higher education 
institutions.  The political party variables were coded as: 1=Republican control, and 0=Not 
Republican control.  The political party variables were calculated as straight-line averages across 
the six years, with computed values closer to 1 reflecting greater Republican control over the 
course of the 6-year sample, and values closer to 0 reflecting less Republican control.   
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Fifth, the relative size of the private non-profit college and university enrollment as 
compared to public institutions had to be calculated for the Level 2 variable PRIVTOPUB.  For-
profit private institutions were not included in this calculation as the comparison was only for 
non-profit colleges and universities.  This data was easily available via the IPEDS database, but 
had to be calculated and coded for the purposes of this study. 
And finally, I addressed the skewness in the data. I ran descriptive statistics on the data in 
SPSS and found that five variables were skewed (undergraduate minority student percentage at 
1.9, the percentage of undergraduate students that are female at -1.07, the percentage of the 
undergraduate student body that are out-of-state students at 1.52, full-time equivalent 
undergraduate enrollment at 1.5, and the amount of merit-based financial aid per capita at 2.3).  
For the purposes of the present study, I transformed any variable which had a skew greater than 
+1 or less than -1 as I sought to produce data that approached normal distribution.  According to 
Zimmerman (1994; 1998), parametric statistical tests benefit when the data in a study are 
normally distributed – or at least tend toward normal distribution. Zimmerman did caution, 
however, that transformation can make analysis more complex as it can change the test in 
question from the prediction of a specific dependent variable to the prediction of the logarithm of 
that dependent variable.  In the present study, while several independent variables were skewed 
and transformed prior to analysis, the dependent variables (graduation rate, black student 
graduation rate, and Hispanic student graduation rate) did not require transformation, which is 
helpful in lessening the burden of interpreting the results from the models.  However, it is worth 
mentioning again that by transforming the skewed independent variables in the present study, I 
was complicating the interpretation of any significant main effects of those variables.  That is, 
my findings and discussion would be based on the natural log of a predictor variable or the 
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square root transformed predictor variable, rather than the raw predictor itself.  Again, this is a 
justifiable course of action when dealing with skewed data, as a more normal distribution does 
not violate the assumptions of parametric testing utilized in the present study. 
In order to transform the data, I performed natural log transformations and square root 
transformations for all five of the skewed variables.  Three of the variables’ skew statistics were 
brought closer to normal distribution (between -1 to 1) via natural log transformations (minority 
student percentage, female student percentage, and merit-based financial aid per capita).  The 
remaining two variables’ skew statistics were brought inside of 1 via square root transformations 
(out-of-state student percentage and full-time equivalent enrollment).   
Sample 
The population of interest included all public, baccalaureate degree-granting colleges and 
universities.  Therefore, four-year institutions that reported a valid graduation rate variable in the 
IPEDS survey met the primary sample criteria. The following Carnegie Classification 2010 
codes were included in the sample: Research Universities (very high research activity); Research 
Universities (high research activity); Doctoral/Research Universities; Master’s Colleges and 
Universities (larger programs); Master’s Colleges and Universities (medium programs); 
Master’s Colleges and Universities (smaller programs); Baccalaureate Colleges – Arts & 
Sciences; and Baccalaureate Colleges – Diverse Fields.  
Due to variations in how states may or may not fund private institutions, and as the 
research questions for the present study are focused specifically on public higher education, only 
public colleges and universities were selected for inclusion in this study.  Institutions that are 
categorized as “public – 4-year or above” in IPEDS were included in the sample.  
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Certificate-granting programs and other specialized colleges that do not produce 
baccalaureate degrees were excluded from the sample as the focus of the present study is on the 
traditional four-year institution.  Additionally, military colleges and universities were excluded 
as they do not receive state funding, and also that their programs generally include additional 
requirements beyond the typical academic requirements of a non-military institution.  This 
parameter resulted in the exclusion of 8 institutions from the total sample. 
Only four-year baccalaureate degree programs were included, as two-year or Associate’s 
programs often have student outcomes other than graduation that are considered successes such 
as an institutional transfer to a baccalaureate program.  As such, the following institutional 
category in IPEDS was selected for inclusion: “degree granting – primarily baccalaureate and 
above.”   
As with prior studies on state funding for higher education, the present study excluded 
Nebraska because the state legislature is a unicameral system.  That is, without a political party 
majority in the system, it is not possible to measure the partisanship in policymaking in the state; 
and partisanship is a key element of the proposed model.  However, as forty-nine of fifty states 
were included in the study, there is little concern about lack of generalizability to the overall 
population of public higher education institutions in the United States, and suggests that external 
validity for the present study is acceptable.  The elimination of Nebraska from the sample 
resulted in the removal of six institutions. 
Finally, as the graduation rate statistic in IPEDS is based on full-time, first-time 
undergraduate students, the sample excluded institutions that reported that they do not have full-
time, first-time undergraduate students.  This exclusion resulted in the removal of 5 more 
institutions from the sample. 
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The present study selected the academic years between 2007 and 2012 for analysis. 
Academic year 2012-2013 was identified as the end of the panel as it is the most recent year of 
data available through all of the necessary data sources at the time I completed the study.  
Academic year 2007 was identified as the beginning of the panel as it includes the cohort of 
students by which the 2012-2013 graduation rate data is based.  The final sample included 516 
public baccalaureate degree-granting institutions in 49 states.  The sample size for the 
comparative research question examining minority sub-groups was slightly smaller as 
institutions with very low levels of minority enrollment (less than 5% minority students) were 
excluded.  The sample size for the question on black student graduation rates was 493, and for 
the question on Hispanic student graduation rates, N=469. 
As a note, sample weights were not utilized in the present study as all institutions in the 
population of four-year, non-profit, public institutions were included in the sample (with the sole 
exception of Nebraska, which is excluded based on its unicameral state political system).  That 
is, there is no over/under-sampling issue.  Also, as institutions are compelled to submit data to 
IPEDS to maintain eligibility for federal financial aid, there were only two variables that had 
missing data: Hispanic graduation rate (8.9% of the sample) and SAT scores (6.8% of the 
sample).  This missing data issue was addressed by pairwise deletion for Hispanic graduation 
rate data, and by assigning an imputed score for SAT score data.   That is, for the missing 
Hispanic graduation rate data, those institutions were included in the primary research question 
analysis, but were excluded for the comparative question.  As for the missing SAT scores, the 
only institutions that were missing data were open admissions colleges and universities.  As 
such, imputed scores that were similar to those at comparable institutions with greater than 90% 
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admit rates were assigned to the open admissions colleges and universities that were missing 
SAT data. 
Descriptive statistics on the sample can be found below in Tables 2-4, followed by 
collinearity diagnostics for the sample. 
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Table	2	-	Descriptive	statistics	for	raw	data 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std..Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
GRADRATE Six*year/graduation/rate/for/all/full*time,/first*time/undergraduate/students/in/the/2007/cohort 516 0.04 0.93 0.48 0.17
BLACKGRADRATESix*year/graduation/rate/for/all/black/full*time,/first*time/undergraduate/students/in/the/2007/cohort 493 0.01 1.00 0.39 0.18
HISPGRADRATE Six*year/graduation/rate/for/all/Hispanic/full*time,/first*time/undergraduate/students/in/the/2007/cohort 469 0.06 1.00 0.45 0.18
MINPERC Percentage/of/undergraduate/underrepresented/minority/students/(averaged/over/6/years)/* 516 0.02 0.96 0.22 0.23
FEMALE Percentage/of/undergraduate/students/that/are/female/(averaged/over/6/years)/ 516 0.11 0.91 0.56 0.08
PELLPERC Percentage/of/undergraduate/students/that/receive/////////////////Pell/grants/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 0.82 0.36 0.15
SAT25 SAT/score,/or/converted/ACT/score,/at/the/25th/percentile/(averaged/over/6/years)/ 516 440 1250 920 164
SAT75 SAT/score,/or/converted/ACT/score,/at/the/75th/percentile/(averaged/over/6/years)/ 516 660 1450 1140 176
OUTST Percentage/of/out*of*state/undergraduate/students/in///////////the/2007/cohort/ 516 0.00 0.90 0.15 0.15
FTFAC Percentage/of/instructional/staff/that/are/employed/fulltime 516 0.15 1.00 0.68 0.17
CARNEGIE Carnegie/classification 516 1.00 4.00 2.43 1.08
FTE Fulltime/Equivalent/undergraduate/enrollment/////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years)/ 516 570 58538 11323 10012
TUITION In*state/tuition/and/fees/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 2000 14774 6974 2359
REVTUITION Percentage/of/institutional/revenue/comprised/of/tuition/and/fees/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 0.92 0.31 0.12
EXPINSTR Percentage/of/institutional/expenditures/comprised/of/instruction/expenses/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.11 0.61 0.40 0.07
EXPSS Percentage/of/institutional/expenditures/comprised///////////////////of/student/services/expenses/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.02 0.23 0.09 0.04
APPPC State/appropriations/per/resident/over/the/age/of/18 516 114 727 315 92
NEEDAID Need*based/financial/aid/per/resident/over/the/age/of/18 516 0.16 57.41 24.85 16.32
MERITAID Merit*based/financial/aid/per/resident/over/the/age/of/18/ 516 0.00 82.12 11.20 20.44
PBF Use/of/performance*based/funding/program/at/any/point/between/2007*2013 516 0.00 1.00 0.51 0.50
UNEMPLOY State/unemployment/rate/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.01
INCOME Personal/income/per/capita/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 31073 56326 39861 5618
POPBACHDEG Percentage/of/the/state/population/over/the/age/of/24/with///////at/least/a/bachelor's/degree/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.17 0.39 0.27 0.05
GOVPARTY Political/party/affiliation/of/the/state/governor/////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.36
LEGMAJPARTY Political/party/majority/of/the/state/legislature////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.39
GOVBOARD Presence/of/a/consolidated/governing/board////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.47
PRIVTOPUB Ratio/of/private/undergraduate/enrollment/to/public/undergraduate/enrollment/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.01 0.67 0.28 0.14
Descriptive.Statistics.5.Raw.Data
Variable(code Variable.description
 	 65	
	
Table	3	-	Descriptive	statistics	for	transformed	data 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std..Dev.
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
GRADRATE Six*year/graduation/rate/for/all/full*time,/first*time/undergraduate/students/in/the/2007/cohort 516 0.04 0.93 0.48 0.17
BLACKGRADRATESix*year/graduation/rate/for/all/black/full*time,/first*time/undergraduate/students/in/the/2007/cohort 493 0.01 1.00 0.39 0.18
HISPGRADRATE Six*year/graduation/rate/for/all/Hispanic/full*time,/first*time/undergraduate/students/in/the/2007/cohort 469 0.06 1.00 0.45 0.18
MINPERC Percentage/of/undergraduate/underrepresented/minority/students/(averaged/over/6/years)/*/LN/transformed 516 *4.14 *0.04 *1.94 0.94
FEMALE Percentage/of/undergraduate/students/that/are/female/(averaged/over/6/years)/*/LN/transformed 516 0.00 0.59 0.30 0.06
PELLPERC Percentage/of/undergraduate/students/that/receive/Pell////////////grants/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 0.82 0.36 0.15
SAT25 SAT/score,/or/converted/ACT/score,/at/the/25th/percentile/(averaged/over/6/years)/*/sqrt/transformed 516 0.35 1.25 0.91 0.12
SAT75 SAT/score,/or/converted/ACT/score,/at/the/75th/percentile/(averaged/over/6/years)/*/sqrt/transformed 516 0.47 1.83 1.13 0.13
OUTST Percentage/of/out*of*state/undergraduate/students/in/the///////////2007/cohort/*/sqrt/transformed 516 0.00 0.95 0.34 0.19
FTFAC Percentage/of/instructional/staff/that/are/employed/fulltime 516 0.15 1.00 0.68 0.17
CARNEGIE Carnegie/classification 516 1.00 4.00 2.43 1.08
FTE Fulltime/Equivalent/undergraduate/enrollment//////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years)/*/sqrt/transformed 516 0.75 7.65 3.06 1.40
TUITION In*state/tuition/and/fees/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 2 15 7 2
REVTUITION Percentage/of/institutional/revenue/comprised/of/tuition/and/fees/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 0.92 0.31 0.12
EXPINSTR Percentage/of/institutional/expenditures/comprised/of/instruction/expenses/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.11 0.61 0.40 0.07
EXPSS Percentage/of/institutional/expenditures/comprised/of///////////////student/services/expenses/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.02 0.23 0.09 0.04
APPPC State/appropriations/per/resident/over/the/age/of/18 516 0 1 0 0
NEEDAID Need*based/financial/aid/per/resident/over/the/age/of/18 516 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02
MERITAID Merit*based/financial/aid/per/resident/over/the/age/of/18///////////LN/transformed 516 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.02
PBF Use/of/performance*based/funding/program/at/any/point/between/2007*2013 516 0.00 1.00 0.51 0.50
UNEMPLOY State/unemployment/rate/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.01
INCOME Personal/income/per/capita/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 31 56 40 6
POPBACHDEG Percentage/of/the/state/population/over/the/age/of/24/with///////at/least/a/bachelor's/degree/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 17.33 38.67 27.01 4.81
GOVPARTY Political/party/affiliation/of/the/state/governor////////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.36
LEGMAJPARTY Political/party/majority/of/the/state/legislature///////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.39
GOVBOARD Presence/of/a/consolidated/governing/board///////////////////////(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.47
PRIVTOPUB Ratio/of/private/undergraduate/enrollment/to/public/undergraduate/enrollment/(averaged/over/6/years) 516 0.01 0.67 0.28 0.14
Descriptive.Statistics.5.Transformed.Data
Variable(code Variable.description
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Table	4	-	Mean	IPEDS	graduation	rates	by	state	(National	Center	for	Education	Statistics,	2013b) 
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 To check for collinearity among the variables in the model, I conducted two tests: 
Pearson coefficients and the variance inflation factor (VIF) / tolerance test.  The Pearson test 
identified three strong correlations (SAT scores at the 25th percentile and percentage of Pell grant 
recipients, r=-.648, p<.001; SAT scores at the 75th percentile and percentage of Pell grant 
recipients, r=-.62, p<.001; and SAT scores at the 25th percentile and SAT scores at the 75th 
percentile, r=.893, p<.001).  However, the results of the VIF tolerance statistics revealed no 
significant concerns about multicollinearity as all tolerances were greater than .1 and all VIF 
statistics were between 1 and 7, with the highest values for SAT scores at the 25th percentile 
(6.13), SAT scores at the 75th percentiles (5.65), and income per capita (5.67).  As such, no 
variables were removed from the models due to collinearity issues.  The full Pearson coefficients 
table and VIF/tolerance table can be found in Appendices A and B. 
Analyses 
The analyses for the present study can be broken into three sections, with the statistical 
methods being informed by the three research questions.  The primary variables of interest in the 
present study were the three funding vehicles of appropriations per capita, need-based financial 
aid per capita, and merit-based financial aid per capita, as they relate to institutional graduation 
rates.  All other variables in the model are included as control variables according to the prior 
literature.   
Through the analyses for the first research question, I fitted four successive mixed models 
via hierarchical linear modeling, until reaching a fully-conditioned model with all predictors 
included at both Level 1 and Level 2.   That is, I fitted models with no predictors at either level; 
with funding vehicles and additional control vehicles at Level 2; with control variables at Level 1 
and no covariates at Level 2; and with control variables at Level 1 and Level 2 in addition to the 
 	 68	
Level 2 variables of interest (appropriations, need-based financial aid, and merit-based financial 
aid).  The models for Research Question 1 are described in greater detail below in Table 5.  
Fixed effects and/or random effects were presented and discussed for each of the fitted models as 
appropriate, and each model was compared with a prior model by evaluating whether the 
variance was reduced with the addition of Level 1 and/or Level 2 predictors.  While it is 
ultimately the final model (Model D below) that will answer the first research questions in the 
present study, the iterative approach toward model-building used here is consistent with prior 
research utilizing HLM across many fields including education, business, social services, and 
healthcare to name a few (Parboteeah, Hoegl, & Muethel, 2015; Liu, 2008; Gumus, 2014; 
Valente & Oliveira, 2011; Gomes, dos Santos, Zhu, Eisenmann, & Maia, 2014).   
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Table 5 - Description and purpose of proposed models 
Model type Description Purpose
Level 1    
covariates
Level 2    
covariates
M
od
el
 A
  One-way     
ANOVA            
with random  
effects
Predict the Level 1 
intercept of graduation 
rate (dependent variable) 
as a random effect of the 
Level 2 state grouping 
variable.
Determine if graduation 
rates are significantly 
different from zero 
across states, thus 
justifying the use of 
hieararchical modeling.
none none
M
od
el
 B
  
Means-as-
outcomes 
regression 
Predict the Level 1 
intercept of graduation 
rate (dependent variable) 
as a random effect of the 
Level 2 state grouping 
variable as well as the 
Level 2 covariates.                          
Mean graduation rates 
are adjusted by the Level 
2 predictors.
Determine the amount 
of variance at Level 2 
that can be explained 
by the fitted model.
none
APPPC            
NEEDAID          
MERITAID                
PBF                
UNEMPLOY             
INCOME              
POPBACHDEG             
GOVPARTY           
LEGMAJPARTY            
GOVBOARD          
PRIVTOPUB
M
od
el
 C
  
ANCOVA        
with random   
effects
Predict the Level 1 
intercept of graduation 
rate (dependent variable) 
as a random effect of 
state grouping variable, 
after controlling for the 
fixed effects Level 1 
covariates in the model.
Determine the amount 
of variance at Level 1 
that can be explained 
by the fitted model.
MINPERC       
FEMALE     
PELLPERC         
SAT25                
SAT75              
OUTST            
FTFAC       
CARNEGIE            
FTE              
TUITION       
REVTUITION        
EXPINSTR        
EXPSS 
none
M
od
el
 D
  
Random     
intercept 
ANCOVA
Predict the Level 1 
intercept of graduation 
rate (dependent variable) 
as a random effect of the 
Level 2 state grouping 
variable, random effect of 
the Level 2 covariates, 
and fixed effect of the 
Level 1 covariates.               
This final model serves 
to answer the research 
question about the 
impact of funding 
vehicles on graduation 
rates.
MINPERC       
FEMALE     
PELLPERC         
SAT25                
SAT75              
OUTST            
FTFAC       
CARNEGIE            
FTE              
TUITION       
REVTUITION        
EXPINSTR        
EXPSS             
APPPC            
NEEDAID          
MERITAID                
PBF                
UNEMPLOY             
INCOME              
POPBACHDEG             
GOVPARTY           
LEGMAJPARTY            
GOVBOARD          
PRIVTOPUB
Description and Purpose of Proposed Models
Source: Garson, 2013; Maeda, 2007
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For Research Question 2, I fit two models (Model E and Model F) that are the same as 
Model D but with different outcome variables: Model E examines black student graduation rates 
while Model F evaluates Hispanic student graduation rates.   These models will allow for an 
examination of the relationship between funding vehicles and minority student graduation rates 
once all the covariates have been accounted for in the model. 
And finally, to answer Research Question 3, I will extend Model D to also include 
random effects of the interaction effect between minority student percentage (MINPERC) and 
the three funding vehicles (APPPC, NEEDAID, and MERITAID) into Model G).  
Research Question 1: How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of 
institutional appropriations and student financial aid associated with six-year graduation 
rates at four-year, public institutions? 
Research Question 2: How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of 
institutional appropriations and student financial aid associated with black and Hispanic 
student six-year graduation rates at four-year, public institutions? 
Research Question 3: Does state public higher education funding via appropriations or 
financial aid affect institutions with greater proportions of minority students differently 
than institutions with lower proportions of minority students on the outcome of 
institutional graduation rates? 
Research Question 1 – Outcome variable: institutional graduation rate (GRADRATE) 
First, I utilized the HLM 7.0.1 software to run a fully unconditional model.  This one-way 
ANOVA with random effects included no predictors at Level 1 or Level 2.  This unconditional 
means model identified how much variance in the dependent variable is found between groups. 
In this case, I was examining the amount of variance in graduation rates that is found between 
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states, rather than between institutions.  An unconditional model in HLM (or one-way ANOVA 
with random effects) is different from a one-way ANOVA with fixed effects as it also includes a 
random effect at Level 2 (Maeda, 2007) represented by u0j in Equation 1. 
 
MODEL A: UNCONDITIONAL MEANS MODEL    (1) 
Yij =  β0j + rij    
β0j = γ00 + u0j

In the Level 1 equation, Yij represents the dependent variable, β0j  represents the intercept, 
and rij is the error term.  That is, the intercept (β0j) is a random variable for which a linear 
regression model was specified according to the Level 2 group; in this case by state.  As such, in 
the Level 2 equation, β0j represents the dependent variable, γ00 represents the Level 2 intercept, 
and u0jis the Level 2 residual or random term.  Thinking of the model conceptually, institutional 
graduation rates are a function of mean graduation rates across all of the institutions in the state, 
plus some amount of variation between the institutions (rij); and mean graduation rates are a 
function of mean graduation rates over all states’ institutions plus some amount of variation 
between the states, or u0j (Niehaus, Campbell, & Inkelas, 2014). 
From the results of the unconditional means model, I then calculated the intraclass 
correlation coefficient, or ICC, to use as comparative baseline for the conditioned models in 
subsequent steps of the analyses.  The ICC (ρ) equation was computed using σ2, or the variance 
in the dependent variable that can be explained by a Level 1 model, and τ00, or the total variance 
explainable at Level 2.  That is, the ICC represents the ratio of the between-group variance to the 
total variance in the dependent variable (Garson, 2013).  
   INTRACLASS CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  (2) 
   ρ = τ00 / (τ00 + σ2) 
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Second, I fitted a means-as-outcomes regression model in order to evaluate the difference 
between the unconditional variance in graduation rates over institutions and the variance in 
graduation rates over institutions after the random effects of Level 2 covariates and the random 
effects of the Level 2 grouping variable had been taken into account.  As the purpose of this step 
was to evaluate the Level 2 variance in graduation rates, this model did not include Level 1 
predictors.   
All Level 2 covariates were grand-mean centered except for the dichotomous variables of 
performance-based funding system (PBF) and consolidated governing board (GOVBOARD). 
Grand-mean centering is achieved by taking each variable value and subtracting the grand mean 
from all of the data values (Garson, 2013).  In effect, grand-mean centering controls for 
differentiation between the higher levels in the observed outcome, and allows for the intercepts 
to be more easily interpreted in the analyses process (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  Stated 
differently, linear models fitted with un-centered data and grand-mean centered data will be 
linearly equivalent (Kreft, de Leeuw, and Aiken, 1995) unlike models that utilize group-mean 
centering. 
 
 MODEL B: MEANS-AS-OUTCOMES REGRESSION     (3) 
    GRADRATEij = γ00 + γ01*APPPCj + γ02*NEEDAIDj + γ03*MERITAIDj   + γ04*PBFj + 
 γ05*UNEMPLOYj + γ06*INCOMEj + γ07*POPBACHDj    + γ08*GOVPARTYj + 
 γ09*LEGMAJPAj + γ010*GOVBOARDj + γ011*PRIVTOPUj  + u0j+ rij 
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I then calculated R2 to test the amount of Level 2 variance explained by the resultant 
models.  That is, this R2 calculated the amount of variance between states that could be explained 
by the model. 
 
Level 2 R2 = (τuncond - τcond) / τuncond       (4) 
 
Third, I fitted a random effects ANCOVA model in HLM with grand-mean centered 
level-1 predictors.  The purpose of this model was to reduce the unexplained variance at Level 1 
by accounting for the effects of the chosen covariates.  For the purposes of the present study, the 
Level 1 predictors are assumed to have a fixed effect across Level 2 groups, in that the slopes of 
the regression lines do not vary.  That is, there is no theoretical reason to believe that the impact 
of the chosen Level 1 covariates will differ from state to state.  While the intercept of the overall 
regression line is still represented as β0j, the intercept of each state’s regression line can vary as 
represented by β0j + u0j.  That is, the random effects in this model refer to the intercepts, which 
are permitted to vary by state (Level 2 grouping variable).  The random effects ANCOVA model 
is appropriate for assessing variance at Level 1 in the present study, as the Level 1 variables are 
just control variables and not variables of particular interest that would perhaps suggest the need 
to also include random effects. 
 
MODEL C: ANCOVA WITH RANDOM EFFECTS    (5) 
         GRADRATEij = γ00   + γ10*MINPERCij    + γ20*FEMALEij    + γ30*PELLPERCij    +  
  γ40*SAT25ij     + γ50*SAT75ij    + γ60*OUTSTij     + γ70*FTFACij  +    
  γ80*CARNEGIEij     + γ90*FTEij     + γ100*TUITIONij     +     
  γ110*REVTUITIij   + γ120*EXPINSTRij     + γ130*EXPSSij      + u0j+ rij  
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I then calculated the R2 to test the amount of Level 1 variance that is explained by the 
resultant model. 
Level 1 R2 = 1-( σ2cond + τcond)/(σ2uncond+ τuncond)   (6)  
 
Fourth, I fitted a random intercept ANCOVA model with grand-mean centered Level 1 
predictors as well as grand-mean centered Level 2 predictors. This model predicted the Level 1 
intercept of graduation rates as a random effect of the Level 2 grouping variable, random effect 
of the Level 2 covariates, and fixed effect of the Level 1 covariates.  In the present study, I was 
particularly interested in the main effect of funding vehicles (Level 2 variables) on state’s mean 
graduation rates, after taking into account the covariates at Level 1 and Level 2.  Given that the 
research questions in the present study were focused on examining the graduation rate adjusted 
means, the random intercept model was the appropriate choice for this phase of the analysis 
(Garson, 2013; Parboteeah, Hoegl, & Muethel, 2015; Pillinger, n.d.). Finally, this model would 
ultimately determine the relationship between state funding vehicles and graduation rates once 
all of the covariates had been taken into account at Level 1 and Level 2. 
 
MODEL D: RANDOM INTERCEPT ANCOVA MODEL     (7) 
    GRADRATEij = γ00 + γ01*APPPCj + γ02*NEEDAIDj + γ03*MERITAIDj     + γ04*PBFj + 
 γ05*UNEMPLOYj + γ06*INCOMEj + γ07*POPBACHDj     + γ08*GOVPARTYj + 
 γ09*LEGMAJPAj + γ010*GOVBOARDj + γ011*PRIVTOPUj     + γ10*MINPERCij     + 
 γ20*FEMALEij     + γ30*PELLPERCij     + γ40*SAT25ij     + γ50*SAT75ij     + 
 γ60*OUTSTij     + γ70*FTFACij     + γ80*CARNEGIEij    + γ90*FTEij     + 
 γ100*TUITIONij     + γ110*REVTUITIij    + γ120*EXPINSTRij     + γ130*EXPSSij   + u0j+ rij 
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I then calculated whether the inclusion of Level 2 variables reduced the intercept variance 
at Level 1.  And finally, I calculated the conditional ρ for Model D to compare with the 
unconditional ρ in the model with no predictors in order to determine whether or not the state-
level variation in graduation rates was reduced by the fitted model. 
 
Proportion reduction intercept variance = (τMODEL C - τMODEL D) / τMODEL C (8) 
  ρMODEL D = τ00(MODEL D) / (τ00(MODEL A) + σ2(MODEL D))   (9) 
  
Research Question 2 – Replacing outcome with minority graduation rates (black student 
graduation rate or BLACKGRADRATE and Hispanic student graduation rate or 
HISPGRADRATE) 
 
Next, to answer Research Question #2, I fitted two random intercept ANCOVA models, 
as described above in Model D, with two different outcome variables.  First I used the 
institutional graduation rate for black students (BLACKGRADRATE) as the outcome variable 
for Model E, and then I used the institutional graduation rate for Hispanic students 
(HISPGRADRATE) as the outcome variable for Model F. 
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MODEL E – RANDOM INERCEPT ANCOVA MODEL WITH BLACK STUDENT 
GRADUATION RATES AS THE OUTCOME VARIABLE    (10) 
    BLACKGRADRATEij = γ00 + γ01*APPPCj + γ02*NEEDAIDj + γ03*MERITAIDj     + 
 γ04*PBFj +  γ05*UNEMPLOYj + γ06*INCOMEj + γ07*POPBACHDj    + 
 γ08*GOVPARTYj +  γ09*LEGMAJPAj + γ010*GOVBOARDj + γ011*PRIVTOPUj   + 
 γ10*MINPERCij     +  γ20*FEMALEij     + γ30*PELLPERCij   + γ40*SAT25ij     + 
 γ50*SAT75ij    + γ60*OUTSTij     + γ70*FTFACij     + γ80*CARNEGIEij     + γ90*FTEij   + 
 γ100*TUITIONij    + γ110*REVTUITIij     + γ120*EXPINSTRij   + γ130*EXPSSij   + u0j+ rij 
 
MODEL F – RANDOM INERCEPT ANCOVA MODEL WITH HISPANIC STUDENT 
GRADUATION RATES AS THE OUTCOME VARIABLE    (11) 
    HISPGRADRATEij = γ00 + γ01*APPPCj + γ02*NEEDAIDj + γ03*MERITAIDj     +  γ04*PBFj + 
 γ05*UNEMPLOYj + γ06*INCOMEj + γ07*POPBACHDj     +  γ08*GOVPARTYj + 
 γ09*LEGMAJPAj + γ010*GOVBOARDj + γ011*PRIVTOPUj    + γ10*MINPERCij    + 
 γ20*FEMALEij    + γ30*PELLPERCij     + γ40*SAT25ij     +  γ50*SAT75ij     + 
 γ60*OUTSTij     + γ70*FTFACij     + γ80*CARNEGIEij     + γ90*FTEij  + γ100*TUITIONij     + 
 γ110*REVTUITIij     + γ120*EXPINSTRij     +  γ130*EXPSSij   + u0j+ rij 
 
Research Question 3 – Outcome variable of institutional graduation rate (GRADRATE), 
with inclusion of interaction effects of minority student percentage with appropriations per 
capita, need-based financial aid per capita, and merit-based financial aid per capita 
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Finally, in order to answer the second research question about whether funding vehicles 
impact institutions with greater minority enrollment percentages differently than other 
institutions, I fitted an exploratory slopes-as-outcomes model.  Model G included all of the same 
Level 1 and Level 2 predictors as Model D above, but allowed the minority student percentage 
slopes to vary randomly with the inclusion of the Level 2 random effects term (u1j*MINPERCij ).  
Model G also included interaction effects between MINPERC and each of the three funding 
vehicles of APPPC, NEEDAID, and MERITAID.  This cross-level interaction is designed to not 
just evaluate the relationship between funding vehicles and graduation rate, but also to determine 
how that effect might change depending on some additional context (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002).  In this case, the context of interest includes the percentage of minority students at the 
institution.  That is, does the impact of funding vehicle choice on graduation rates differ as the 
percentage of minority students at an institution changes?  The fixed portion of the model 
includes the Level 1 covariates, and the random portions of the model include the Level 2 
covariates, the randomly varying slope of minority student percentage (MINPERC), and the 
interaction effects between minority student percentage (MINPERC) and funding vehicles 
(APPPC, NEEDAID, and MERITAID). 
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MODEL G: SLOPES-AS-OUTCOMES MODEL      (12) 
    GRADRATEij = γ00 + γ01*APPPCj + γ02*NEEDAIDj + γ03*MERITAIDj    + γ04*PBFj + 
 γ05*UNEMPLOYj + γ06*INCOMEj + γ07*POPBACHDj    + γ08*GOVPARTYj + 
 γ09*LEGMAJPAj + γ010*GOVBOARDj + γ011*PRIVTOPUj     + γ10*MINPERCij + 
 γ11*APPPCj*MINPERCij + γ12*NEEDAIDj*MINPERCij + 
 γ13*MERITAIDj*MINPERCij  + γ20*FEMALEij     + γ30*PELLPERCij     + 
 γ40*SAT25ij     + γ50*SAT75ij    + γ60*OUTSTij    + γ70*FTFACij  + γ80*CARNEGIEij     + 
 γ90*FTEij  + γ100*TUITIONij   + γ110*REVTUITIij   + γ120*EXPINSTRij   + 
 γ130*EXPSSij    + u1j*MINPERCij + rij 
 
Limitations of the present study 
 Before presenting the results of the study in the next chapter, I would like to mention 
several limitations of the present study.  First, while the cross-sectional design of the present 
study serves as an appropriate starting point for further understanding the relationship between 
funding vehicles and graduation rates, longitudinal or panel data could provide an even more in-
depth evaluation.  That is, the present study is limited to evaluating the persistence of the 
students beginning in 2007 – students who may or may not have been markedly different than 
students starting in another year, for example.  Additionally, by using data from a single cohort, I 
fail to capture data on economic or political events or circumstances from just outside of the 
selected cohort years.  Using data from multiple cohorts in future research could ease this 
limitation. 
 Second, while group sizes can be different in HLM and still produce interpretable results, 
it is not ideal to have a group with only a single institution – as was the case with Wyoming in 
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the present study.  That is, as group sizes decrease, the effect of the analysis more and more 
closely resembles OLS regression.  However, I chose to keep Wyoming in the sample as it does 
not necessarily harm the analysis to have a group with only one institution, and provides one 
more state-level context to the sample.  Additionally, as a robustness check, I ran the models 
without the Wyoming data included. None of the significant results changed as a result of the 
exclusion. 
 Third, for this exploratory analysis of funding vehicles and graduation rates I chose not to 
have slopes vary randomly with the exception of Model G for Research Question 3.  This was a 
justifiable methodological choice as my research questions dealt with comparing graduation rate 
means (intercepts) after controlling for certain covariates at Level 1 and Level 2.  However, an 
obvious next step to build upon the present research would be to include additional random 
effects in the models to further the understanding of the relationship between funding vehicles 
and institutional outcomes. 
 Fourth, while data aggregation is a common practice in any type of research, there are 
drawbacks to this choice.  That is, while SAT score averages can speak about the student body at 
a given institution, it ignores individual student differences that may be quite obvious if the data 
were not aggregated to the institutional level.  The use of student-level data was outside of the 
scope of this study, but any time data is aggregated for inclusion in a statistical model, the impact 
of this aggregation must be considered when interpreting results. 
 Finally, as mentioned earlier in the proposal, the IPEDS graduation rate statistic only 
captures data on full-time, first-time students and whether or not they graduate within six years at 
their first institution.  Thus, the outcomes of students that do not meet these criteria are not 
included in the present study.  While countless other studies in the field of higher education 
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research utilize this IPEDS statistic, I would be remiss without again mentioning that not all 
students are captured in this outcome measurement. 
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Chapter 4 – Results 
 The purpose of this study was to determine whether a correlation exists between state 
funding vehicle choices of appropriations versus financial aid, and institutional graduation rates.  
Additionally, considering the lower graduation rates obtained by underrepresented minority 
students, I extended the study to also include the outcomes of black student graduation rate and 
Hispanic student graduation rate to determine if a correlation exists between funding vehicles 
and graduation rates of these minority students.  Finally, I sought to evaluate whether institutions 
with greater minority student percentages were impacted differently by funding vehicle choices 
of the state government than institutions with lower minority student enrollment.  
The results from the statistical models will be presented in this chapter first by the 
examination of the dependent variable of GRADRATE, or the six-year graduation rate for all 
full-time, first-time students at an institution (Research Question 1).  I will present the results 
from each model, including the fixed and random effects outputs, and identify any significant 
coefficients. I will also present the calculations for reduction in variance for the successive 
models as applicable.  Subsequently, I will present the results of the conditioned models 
examining black student graduation rates (BLACKGRADRATE) and Hispanic student 
graduation rates (HISPGRADRATE) in order to address the comparative question (Research 
Question 2).  Finally, I will discuss the results from the models addressing the question about 
institutions with greater minority student percentages and the outcome variable of institutional 
graduation rates (Research Question 3). 
Before presenting the results below, I would again like to mention that five of the 
predictor variables were transformed to address skewness and to bring their respective 
distributions more toward normal (female student percentage, minority student percentage, FTE 
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enrollment, out-of-state student percentage, and merit-based financial aid per capita).  Therefore, 
when I discuss the variables in this chapter, I am referring to their transformed values rather than 
the raw figures.  For example, female student percentage is actually referring to the female 
student percentage variable that was log transformed.  While this distinction does not invalidate 
any significant findings, it is just important to consider that these results are based on analyses 
using transformed variables. 
Research Question 1 --  How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of 
institutional appropriations and student financial aid associated with six-year graduation rates 
at four-year, public institutions? 
MODEL A: UNCONDITIONAL MEANS MODEL 
Final estimation of fixed effects 
(with robust standard errors)  
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
 Approx. 
d.f.  p-value 
For INTRCPT1, β0  
    INTRCPT2, γ00  0.478004 0.007482 63.883 515 <0.001 
 
Final estimation of variance components 
Random Effect Standard  Deviation 
Variance 
 Component   d.f. χ
2 p-value 
INTRCPT1, u0 0.07449 0.00555 515 637.12977 <0.001 
level-1, r 0.15296 0.02340       
 
The first model fitted was the unconditional means model, or a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The average institutional graduation rate was statistically different from 
zero (γ00=0.478, t=63.883, d.f.=515, p<0.001).  There was also variation in the state means for 
graduation rates (τ00=0.00555, χ2 =637.13, d.f.=515, p<0.001).  This significant random effect 
serves to validate the continuation with hierarchical linear modeling techniques in the study.  
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That is, the use of HLM methods must first be justified by demonstrating that mean graduation 
rates were significantly different from zero in the unconditional means model (Chen & St. John, 
2011). 
 The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC=0.192) calculation revealed that 19% of the 
variance in graduation rates can be found at the state level, while the remaining 81% can be 
found at the institution level.  This ICC was consistent with prior multilevel research on 
graduation rates, and was not surprising as the institution level of the model represents both 
institutional factors as well as aggregated student-level data.  That is, no matter how similar two 
states are in terms of political leaning and economic circumstances, there will always be great 
variation between institutions and students attending colleges and universities due to the 
decentralized structure of higher education in this country and the diversity of the individuals 
attending college (race, age, SAT scores, and academic preparedness as a few examples).  And 
while these student and institutional factors comprise 81% of the variation in graduation rates, 
nearly a fifth of the variation does occur at the state level.  To demonstrate the variation in mean 
graduation rates, a simple average of institutional graduation rates by state ranges anywhere from 
23% and 33% for Alaska and New Mexico at the low end, up to 65% and 69% for Virginia and 
Iowa at the high end.  Niehaus, Campbell, and Inkelas, (2014) found in their review of higher 
education research articles that employed HLM that there is justification for utilizing HLM even 
with only a small amount of variance at Level 2.  As such, I continued with the remainder of the 
HLM analyses. 
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MODEL B: MEANS-AS-OUTCOMES REGRESSION 
Final estimation of fixed effects 
(with robust standard errors)  
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
 Approx. 
d.f.  p-value 
For INTRCPT1, β0  
    INTRCPT2, γ00  0.468806 0.013013 36.026 504 <0.001 
    APPPC, γ01  -0.144873 0.093761 -1.545 504 0.123 
    NEEDAID, γ02  1.161386 0.633496 1.833 504 0.067 
    MERITAID, γ03  -0.044975 0.407418 -0.110 504 0.912 
     PBF, γ04  -0.015918 0.015066 -1.057 504 0.291 
    UNEMPLOY, γ05  2.172763 0.648748 3.349 504 <0.001 
    INCOME, γ06  0.007029 0.002781 2.527 504 0.012 
    POPBACHD, γ07  0.001848 0.002919 0.633 504 0.527 
    GOVPARTY, γ08  -0.037136 0.025240 -1.471 504 0.142 
    LEGMAJPA, γ09  0.020971 0.024740 0.848 504 0.397 
    GOVBOARD, γ010  0.051748 0.019889 2.602 504 0.010 
    PRIVTOPU, γ011  -0.000400 0.067086 -0.006 504 0.995 
 
Final estimation of variance components 
Random Effect Standard  Deviation 
Variance 
 Component   d.f. χ
2 p-value 
INTRCPT1, u0 0.06978 0.00487 504 623.50248 <0.001 
level-1, r 0.14330 0.02054       
 
  For the means-as-outcomes regression model with all Level 2 variables included (Model 
B), the coefficient (γ00=0.47) is the predicted graduation rate when all of the covariates are 
valued at zero.  None of the funding vehicles were found significant in the regression model. 
Additional discussion on this null finding is found below in the chapter as it relates to the 
outcome of Model D. 
While the null finding was a bit unexpected, it is worth noting that only three of the 
eleven Level 2 variables were found to be significant in the means-as-outcomes regression model 
which only included the Level 2 variables of interest and covariates.  That is, unemployment rate 
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(UNEMPLOY; γ05 = 2.17; p<0.001), income per capita (INCOME; γ06 = 0.007; p=0.012), and the 
presence of a state-wide consolidated governing board (GOVBOARD; γ010 = 0.052; p=0.01) 
were significant and positively related to graduation rates.  The positive direction of each of 
these relationships is consistent with prior research.  However, the strength of the unemployment 
rate relationship with graduation rates is quite strong with a one unit or one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate resulting in an increase in graduation rates by 2.17 percentage 
points.  While the size of this effect is larger than prior research, it does make intuitive sense that 
a lack of jobs might encourage a student to persist to degree completion.  As an example, North 
Dakota and South Dakota had the lowest unemployment rates at 3.6% and 4% while Michigan 
and California had rates of 9.9% and 9.4% averaged across the six years of the data for the 
present study.  As expected, North Dakota and South Dakota’s graduation rates were 4.2% and 
4.5% lower than national averages as compared to Michigan and California which were 5.2% 
and 5.7% higher than national averages, respectively.  
 The calculated R2  of 0.123 demonstrates that 12.3% of the Level 2 variance in the 
dependent variable of institutional graduation rate (GRADRATE) is explained by the model 
including all Level 2 predictors.  The p value <.001 for the regression (χ2 = 623.502, d.f.=504) 
suggests that there is still considerable variance between the Level 2 intercepts.  That is, there is 
significant variation among state mean graduation rates that still remains to be explained beyond 
the inclusion of the predictor variables in the present model. 
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MODEL C: ANCOVA WITH RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
Final estimation of fixed effects 
(with robust standard errors)  
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
 Approx. 
d.f.  p-value 
For INTRCPT1, β0  
    INTRCPT2, γ00  0.513911 0.015977 32.165 515 <0.001 
For MINPERC slope, β1  
    INTRCPT2, γ10  0.010211 0.006321 1.615 503 0.107 
For FEMALE slope, β2  
    INTRCPT2, γ20  -0.054286 0.077732 -0.698 503 0.485 
For PELLPERC slope, β3  
    INTRCPT2, γ30  -0.435222 0.054021 -8.057 503 <0.001 
For SAT25 slope, β4  
    INTRCPT2, γ40  0.358380 0.097711 3.668 503 <0.001 
For SAT75 slope, β5  
    INTRCPT2, γ50  -0.016744 0.087894 -0.191 503 0.849 
For OUTST slope, β6  
    INTRCPT2, γ60  0.025392 0.024462 1.038 503 0.300 
For FTFAC slope, β7  
    INTRCPT2, γ70  0.176549 0.029015 6.085 503 <0.001 
For CARNEGIE slope, β8  
    INTRCPT2, γ80  -0.014642 0.006452 -2.269 503 0.024 
For FTE slope, β9  
    INTRCPT2, γ90  0.033664 0.004807 7.003 503 <0.001 
For TUITION slope, β10  
    INTRCPT2, γ100  0.029452 0.002230 13.210 503 <0.001 
For REVTUITI slope, β11  
    INTRCPT2, γ110  -0.307712 0.056153 -5.480 503 <0.001 
For EXPINSTR slope, β12  
    INTRCPT2, γ120  0.266867 0.071362 3.740 503 <0.001 
For EXPSS slope, β13  
    INTRCPT2, γ130  0.176073 0.129169 1.363 503 0.173 
Final estimation of variance components 
Random Effect Standard  Deviation 
Variance 
 Component   d.f. χ
2 p-value 
INTRCPT1, u0 0.03654 0.00134 515 617.64072 0.001 
level-1, r 0.07613 0.00580       
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For the ANCOVA with random effects model (Model C), all Level 1 variables were 
included, with no covariates at Level 2. From the fixed effects table, γ10 , γ20 , γ30 , etc. represent 
the main effect of those respective Level 1 variables.  For example, γ10 represents the main effect 
of minority student percentage on the outcome variable of graduation rate.  Eight of the fourteen 
Level 1 variables were found to be significant.  Of those eight variables, three were found to 
have a negative relationship with graduation rates: percentage of Pell grant recipients (-0.435, 
p<0.001), the ordinal variable of Carnegie classification (-0.015, p=0.024), and percentage of 
institutional revenue from tuition (-0.308, p<0.001).  That is, as each of the covariates increased 
by one unit, there was a corresponding decrease in graduation rates. For example, as the 
percentage of Pell grant recipients increased by 1 unit or 1 percent, there was a decrease in 
graduation rates of .435 points. The remaining five significant Level 1 covariates had a positive 
relationship with graduation rates, or as each of the variables increased by one unit, there was a 
corresponding increase in graduation rates: SAT scores at the 25th percentile (0.358, p<0.001), 
percentage of fulltime faculty (0.177, p<0.001), FTE enrollment (0.034, p<.001), tuition and fees 
(0.029, p<0.001), and percentage of institutional expenditures spent on instruction (0.267, 
p<0.001).   
The direction of each of the above-mentioned relationships with graduation rates is in 
line with the prior research as discussed in Chapter 2, with the exception of percentage of 
institutional revenue from tuition and Carnegie classification.  That is, prior research has found 
that the more an institution relies on tuition as a means of revenue, the more imperative it is for 
the institutions to retain students in order to generate the resultant tuition revenue. It would 
follow, then, that graduation rates would not be adversely affected by greater institutional 
reliance on tuition.  However, the negative relationship found here suggests otherwise for this 
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data.  One explanation for this outcome could be that since enrollment numbers are up for 
colleges and universities, that they are still receiving tuition revenue even though graduation 
rates are down.  That is, from a purely revenue-based perspective, a student that pays tuition year 
over year until graduation in four years is the same as four separate students that begin their 
freshman year but do not return for the following year.  That is not to say that colleges and 
universities are not interested in retaining students, as retention is key for the health of the 
institution from both a mission perspective as well as an economic reality.  However, in terms of 
evaluating the results of this study, steady enrollment even given decreased graduation rates 
could explain the finding that a greater tuition reliance correlated with a drop in institutional 
graduation rates.   
And in terms of Carnegie classification, the data were ordered from 1 to 4, with 1 
representing Baccalaureate colleges and 4 representing research universities with very high 
research activity. The results in the present study suggest that a one-unit increase in Carnegie 
classification (representing a move up the aggregated Carnegie classification from Baccalaureate 
toward research university) results in a decrease in graduation rates by 0.015 percentage points.  
This finding does not align with prior research that also used aggregated ordinal (Bachelors, 
Masters, Doctoral) Carnegie classification data where graduation rates tend to be higher in 
institutions that are higher in the classification.   
Overall mean graduation rates still differed significantly from zero (γ00=0.514, t=32.17, 
d.f.=515, p<0.001), even after controlling for the covariates in the model.  An R2 of .753 
demonstrates that 75.3% of the variance in graduation rates at the institutional level can be 
explained by the resultant model.   
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MODEL D: RANDOM INTERCEPT ANCOVA MODEL 
Final estimation of fixed effects 
(with robust standard errors)  
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
 Approx. 
d.f.  p-value 
For INTRCPT1, β0  
    INTRCPT2, γ00  0.506094 0.014974 33.799 504 <0.001 
    APPPC, γ01  -0.122494 0.057091 -2.146 504 0.032 
    NEEDAID, γ02  0.926743 0.330110 2.807 504 0.005 
    MERITAID, γ03  0.550106 0.218448 2.518 504 0.012 
     PBF, γ04  -0.032656 0.008570 -3.811 504 <0.001 
    UNEMPLOY, γ05  1.010526 0.361920 2.792 504 0.005 
    INCOME, γ06  0.007736 0.001452 5.329 504 <0.001 
    POPBACHD, γ07  -0.004219 0.001488 -2.835 504 0.005 
    GOVPARTY, γ08  -0.026068 0.013097 -1.990 504 0.057 
    LEGMAJPA, γ09  -0.018592 0.013899 -1.338 504 0.182 
    GOVBOARD, γ010  0.024791 0.010513 2.358 504 0.019 
    PRIVTOPU, γ011  0.014459 0.035612 0.406 504 0.685 
For MINPERC slope, β1  
    INTRCPT2, γ10  0.006758 0.006615 1.022 503 0.307 
For FEMALE slope, β2  
    INTRCPT2, γ20  -0.119624 0.071008 -1.685 503 0.093 
For PELLPERC slope, β3  
    INTRCPT2, γ30  -0.417813 0.042983 -9.721 503 <0.001 
For SAT25 slope, β4  
    INTRCPT2, γ40  0.258462 0.070385 3.672 503 <0.001 
For SAT75 slope, β5  
    INTRCPT2, γ50  0.034398 0.064713 0.532 503 0.595 
For OUTST slope, β6  
    INTRCPT2, γ60  0.052971 0.023966 2.210 503 0.028 
For FTFAC slope, β7  
    INTRCPT2, γ70  0.249995 0.025814 9.685 503 <0.001 
For CARNEGIE slope, β8  
    INTRCPT2, γ80  -0.011409 0.006001 -1.901 503 0.058 
For FTE slope, β9  
    INTRCPT2, γ90  0.030742 0.004377 7.023 503 <0.001 
For TUITION slope, β10  
    INTRCPT2, γ100  0.020465 0.002321 8.816 503 <0.001 
For REVTUITI slope, β11  
    INTRCPT2, γ110  -0.146354 0.047756 -3.065 503 0.002 
For EXPINSTR slope, β12  
    INTRCPT2, γ120  0.091643 0.067287 1.362 503 0.174 
For EXPSS slope, β13  
    INTRCPT2, γ130  -0.159526 0.122741 -1.300 503 0.194 
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Final estimation of variance components 
Random Effect Standard  Deviation 
Variance 
 Component   d.f. χ
2 p-value 
INTRCPT1, u0 0.03362 0.00113 504 604.01871 0.002 
level-1, r 0.07007 0.00491       
 
 In the random intercept ANCOVA model (Model D), all Level 1 and Level 2 variables 
were included.  Model D is the fully conditioned model that accounts for all predictors at the 
institution and state levels.  At Level 2, all three of the funding vehicles were found to be 
significant: appropriations per capita (-0.122, p=0.032), need-based financial aid (0.927, 
p=0.005), and merit-based financial aid (0.55, p=0.012).  That is, with a one-unit or $1,000 
increase in appropriations per capita, graduation rates decreased by .122 percentage points in the 
model.  This finding was particularly interesting as prior research has found a negative 
relationship between appropriations and graduation rates, but those studies were comparing 
appropriations vs. financial aid, rather than using all funding vehicles in the model 
simultaneously.  Based on existing literature, it would not be surprising to find a negative 
correlation with graduation rates if appropriations were increased by decreasing need-based aid 
and shifting it to appropriations.  However, that is not what is happening in the present study 
where all three vehicles are included in the Level 2 model.  In terms of financial aid, graduation 
rates increase .927 percentage points when there was a $1,000 increase in need-based financial 
aid per capita; and .55 percentage points when there was a $1,000 increase in merit-based 
financial aid per capita.  While there are mixed results in the literature regarding the effect of 
appropriations or merit-based aid on graduation rates, the positive correlation between need-
based financial aid and graduation rates found here is consistent with prior research.  Also, as a 
point of scale, a $1,000 increase in financial aid per capita is quite a large figure.  In a state like 
 	 91	
New Jersey, for example, this increase would amount to a $6.7 billion line-item in the budget.  
However, even after adjusting the number of zeroes in the funding vehicle increase, the 
significant relationship with graduation rates remains.  
In terms of the Level 2 covariates, the presence of a performance-based funding program 
(-0.032, p<0.001); unemployment rate in the state (1.01, p=0.005); income per capita within the 
state (.008, p<0.001); percentage of state population with at least a bachelor’s degree (-0.004, 
p=0.005); and the presence of a consolidated governing board (.025, p=0.019) were all found to 
be significant in the model.  Like the means-as-outcomes regression above (Model B), the 
correlation between unemployment rate and graduation rate is quite strong, with a 1% increase in 
the unemployment rate correlating with a 1.01% increase in graduation rate.  Again, students are 
more likely to persist if there are few jobs available in the workforce.  Interestingly, the 
percentage of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree was found to have a negative 
relationship with mean graduation rates.  These results do not align with prior research, and do 
not seem to make intuitive sense either as neither the size of undergraduate enrollment nor the 
enrollment as a percentage of the state population seems to explain this negative relationship 
between percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree and institutional graduation rates. 
Also, the presence of a performance-based funding program was found to have a negative 
relationship with graduation rates; adding to the varied results of prior research which has found 
anything from small positive impact to small negative impact to no impact at all on graduation 
rates. 
At Level 1, seven variables were significant in the present model: percentage of students 
receiving Pell grants (-0.418, p<0.001); SAT score at the 25th percentile (0.258, p<0.001); 
percentage of out-of-state students (0.053, p=0.028); percentage of the faculty that are fulltime 
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(0.25, p<0.001); FTE enrollment (0.031, p<0.001); tuition and fees (.02, p<0.001); and 
percentage of institutional revenue from tuition and fees (-0.15, p=0.002).  As with Model C 
above, the direction of all effects of Level 1 predictors were consistent with prior research with 
the exception of percentage of institutional revenue from tuition and fees. 
After expanding the Model C above to also include Level 2 covariates, Carnegie 
classification and the percentage of institutional expenditures on instruction were no longer 
significant in Model D.  On the other hand, the percentage of out-of-state students was not 
significant in Model C, yet was found to significantly contribute to Model D (0.053, p=0.028).  
While the effect size is small at 0.053, it is still a significant covariate in Model D. 
It is also worth mentioning that while the means-as-outcomes model (Model B) did not 
find any of the funding vehicles to be significant, all three are significant in the random intercept 
ANCOVA model (Model D here).  Additionally, only three of the covariates were significant in 
Model B (unemployment rate, income per capita, and presence of a consolidated governing 
board) while five Level 2 covariates were found to significantly contribute to Model D 
(unemployment rate, income per capita, presence of a consolidated governing board, percentage 
of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree, and presence of a performance-based funding 
program). One possible explanation for this unique finding is that while none of the variables 
were found to have correlations and VIF statistics high enough to justify exclusion from the 
models, perhaps some of the correlations between Level 1 and Level 2 predictor variables could 
have caused the null outcome in Model B to change to a significant finding in Model D.  
However, this outcome should be investigated further as none of the Level 1 to Level 2 
correlations were greater than 0.3. 
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 I then determined the impact of the inclusion of Level 2 predictors on the intercept 
variance at Level 2.   
Proportion reduction intercept variance = (τMODEL C - τMODEL D) / τMODEL C  (12) 
= .157, or that the intercept variance in Level 2 was decreased by 15.7% in 
Model D after accounting for the Level 1 covariates. 
 
 Then, by calculating a conditional ρ for the fully conditioned model, I determined 
whether the inclusion of these predictors explained any of the variation over states in the 
outcome of institutional graduation rate (GRADRATE).  
   = .108,  or 10.8%, suggesting that the conditioned model explained nearly 
half of the variation in graduation rates over states as compared to the unconditional ρ of 0.192.  
 
Research Question 2 – How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of 
institutional appropriations and student financial aid associated with black and Hispanic 
student six-year graduation rates at four-year, public institutions? 
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MODEL E – RANDOM INTERCEPT ANCOVA MODEL USING BLACK STUDENT 
GRADUATION RATE AS THE OUTCOME VARIABLE 
Final estimation of fixed effects 
(with robust standard errors)  
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
 Approx. 
d.f.  p-value 
For INTRCPT1, β0  
    INTRCPT2, γ00  0.455603 0.028489 15.992 481 <0.001 
    APPPC, γ01  -0.126583 0.099325 -1.274 481 0.203 
    NEEDAID, γ02  1.602505 0.627677 2.553 481 0.011 
    MERITAID, γ03  1.086082 0.322209 3.371 481 <0.001 
     PBF, γ04  -0.044464 0.013505 -3.292 481 0.001 
    UNEMPLOY, γ05  -0.047408 0.662087 -0.072 481 0.943 
    INCOME, γ06  0.001086 0.003128 0.347 481 0.729 
    POPBACHD, γ07  0.004073 0.003024 1.347 481 0.179 
    GOVPARTY, γ08  0.032521 0.025510 1.275 481 0.203 
    LEGMAJPA, γ09  -0.033373 0.022480 -1.485 481 0.138 
    GOVBOARD, γ010  0.023668 0.017926 1.320 481 0.187 
    PRIVTOPU, γ011  0.154316 0.067264 2.294 481 0.022 
For MINPERC slope, β1  
    INTRCPT2, γ10  0.031214 0.011960 2.610 480 0.009 
For FEMALE slope, β2  
    INTRCPT2, γ20  -0.073855 0.144836 -0.510 480 0.610 
For PELLPERC slope, β3  
    INTRCPT2, γ30  -0.298419 0.082003 -3.639 480 <0.001 
For SAT25 slope, β4  
    INTRCPT2, γ40  0.486806 0.150317 3.239 480 0.001 
For SAT75 slope, β5  
    INTRCPT2, γ50  -0.148888 0.128853 -1.155 480 0.248 
For OUTST slope, β6  
    INTRCPT2, γ60  0.125188 0.042284 2.961 480 0.003 
For FTFAC slope, β7  
    INTRCPT2, γ70  0.174708 0.052696 3.315 480 <0.001 
For CARNEGIE slope, β8  
    INTRCPT2, γ80  -0.022430 0.011195 -2.004 480 0.046 
For FTE slope, β9  
    INTRCPT2, γ90  0.027537 0.008223 3.349 480 <0.001 
For TUITION slope, β10  
    INTRCPT2, γ100  0.018869 0.004244 4.446 480 <0.001 
For REVTUITI slope, β11  
    INTRCPT2, γ110  -0.194431 0.099974 -1.945 480 0.052 
For EXPINSTR slope, β12  
    INTRCPT2, γ120  0.110134 0.133580 0.824 480 0.410 
For EXPSS slope, β13  
    INTRCPT2, γ130  -0.591655 0.232360 -2.546 480 0.011 
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Final estimation of variance components 
Random Effect Standard  Deviation 
Variance 
 Component   d.f. χ
2 p-value 
INTRCPT1, u0 0.05586 0.00312 481 575.56922 0.002 
level-1, r 0.11651 0.01358       
	
 In the random intercept ANCOVA model examining black student graduation rates 
(Model E), all Level 1 and Level 2 variables were included.  At Level 2, two of the three funding 
vehicles were found to be significant: need-based financial aid (1.603, p=0.011), and merit-based 
financial aid (1.086, p<0.001).  That is, with a one-unit or $1,000 increase in need-based 
financial aid per capita, black student graduation rates increased by 1.603 percentage points.  
Black student graduation rates increased 1.086 percentage points when there was a $1,000 
increase in merit-based financial aid.   These results are in line with prior research on financial 
aid and black student graduation rates, provided that the merit-based financial aid does not come 
at the detriment of need-based financial aid – a scenario that is quite frequent in state funding for 
higher education.  And as a point of mention, the coefficients in this random intercept ANCOVA 
model examining black student graduation rates (1.603 for need-based aid, and 1.086 for merit-
based aid) are larger than those found in the prior random intercept ANCOVA model examining 
institutional graduation rates (.927 for need-based aid, and .55 for merit-based aid).  Such a 
finding suggests that black student graduation rates can be greatly impacted by swings in 
financial aid funding, and policymakers and education stakeholders should be aware of this 
relationship. 
In terms of Level 2 covariates, only the presence of a performance-based funding 
program (-0.044, p=0.001) and the ratio of private to public institutions in the state (0.154, 
p=0.022 ) were found to significantly contribute to the model.  It is interesting to note that only 
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two of the Level 2 covariates were significant in this model, as compared to five in the model 
examining institutional graduation rates.  Also, the ratio of private to public institutions in the 
state was found significant in this model but not significant in any of the models examining 
institutional graduation rates or Hispanic student graduation rates.  
 As for Level 1 covariates, nine of the variables were found to be significant.  Six of the 
covariates had a positive relationship with black student graduation rates: minority student 
percentage (0.031, p=0.009); SAT scores at the 25th percentile (0.487, p=0.001); percentage of 
out-of-state students (0.125, p=0.003); percentage of the faculty that are full-time (0.175, 
p<0.001); full-time equivalent enrollment (0.028, p<0.001); and tuition and fees (0.019, 
p<0.001).  The remaining three variables were negatively related to black student graduation 
rates: percentage of Pell grant recipients (-0.298, p<0.001); Carnegie classification (-0.022, 
p=0.046); and the percentage of institutional expenditures on student services (-0.59, p=0.011).  
Two results worth noting are that minority student percentage is positively related to black 
student graduation rates, perhaps highlighting the positive results of increased campus or student 
diversity on black student outcomes; and that the negative relationship between expenditures on 
student services and black student graduation rates does not fit with prior research which has 
found a positive correlation or no correlation between the two. While prior studies were 
controlling for slightly different variables and covariates than the present study, it is still 
surprising to see a negative correlation between student services expenditures and black student 
graduation rates. 
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MODEL F – RANDOM INTERCEPT ANCOVA MODEL USING HISPANIC STUDENT 
GRADUATION RATE AS THE OUTCOME VARIABLE 
Final estimation of fixed effects 
(with robust standard errors)  
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
 Approx. 
d.f.  p-value 
For INTRCPT1, β0  
    INTRCPT2, γ00  0.472569 0.025532 18.509 457 <0.001 
    APPPC, γ01  -0.138882 0.111329 -1.247 457 0.213 
    NEEDAID, γ02  0.596598 0.589338 1.012 457 0.312 
    MERITAID, γ03  1.018773 0.438569 2.323 457 0.021 
     PBF, γ04  -0.030694 0.014354 -2.138 457 0.033 
    UNEMPLOY, γ05  0.649138 0.704930 0.921 457 0.358 
    INCOME, γ06  0.003603 0.002642 1.364 457 0.173 
    POPBACHD, γ07  -0.001331 0.002768 -0.481 457 0.631 
    GOVPARTY, γ08  -0.010986 0.024042 -0.457 457 0.648 
    LEGMAJPA, γ09  -0.017819 0.027086 -0.658 457 0.511 
    GOVBOARD, γ010  0.009110 0.019955 0.457 457 0.648 
    PRIVTOPU, γ011  -0.014659 0.060055 -0.244 457 0.807 
For MINPERC slope, β1  
    INTRCPT2, γ10  0.018736 0.014434 1.298 456 0.195 
For FEMALE slope, β2  
    INTRCPT2, γ20  -0.358578 0.150122 -2.389 456 0.017 
For PELLPERC slope, β3  
    INTRCPT2, γ30  -0.340946 0.107044 -3.185 456 0.002 
For SAT25 slope, β4  
    INTRCPT2, γ40  0.506707 0.150126 3.375 456 <0.001 
For SAT75 slope, β5  
    INTRCPT2, γ50  -0.106891 0.145556 -0.734 456 0.463 
For OUTST slope, β6  
    INTRCPT2, γ60  0.086650 0.051052 1.697 456 0.090 
For FTFAC slope, β7  
    INTRCPT2, γ70  0.130716 0.050645 2.581 456 0.010 
For CARNEGIE slope, β8  
    INTRCPT2, γ80  -0.011019 0.009942 -1.108 456 0.268 
For FTE slope, β9  
    INTRCPT2, γ90  0.025620 0.007413 3.456 456 <0.001 
For TUITION slope, β10  
    INTRCPT2, γ100  0.021472 0.004206 5.106 456 <0.001 
For REVTUITI slope, β11  
    INTRCPT2, γ110  -0.286147 0.116064 -2.465 456 0.014 
For EXPINSTR slope, β12  
    INTRCPT2, γ120  0.095864 0.114482 0.837 456 0.403 
For EXPSS slope, β13  
    INTRCPT2, γ130  -0.058361 0.308507 -0.189 456 0.850 
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Final estimation of variance components 
Random Effect Standard  Deviation 
Variance 
 Component   d.f. χ
2 p-value 
INTRCPT1, u0 0.05744 0.00330 457 545.88332 0.003 
level-1, r 0.11991 0.01438       
 
 In the random intercept ANCOVA model examining Hispanic student graduation rates 
(Model F), all Level 1 and Level 2 variables were included.  At Level 2, only one of the funding 
vehicles was found to contribute significantly to the model:  merit-based financial aid (1.019, 
p=0.021).  That is, as merit-based financial aid increases by one unit or $1,000, Hispanic student 
graduation rates increase by 1.019 percentage points.  As with the model for black student 
graduation rates above, the coefficient for merit-based aid is larger for Hispanic graduation rates 
(1.019) than in Model D with institutional graduation rates at .55.  Again, this suggests that 
Hispanic student graduation rates are strongly correlated with shifts in merit-based financial aid 
levels.  Also, the strong and positive relationship between merit-based aid and Hispanic student 
graduation rates adds to the already conflicted prior research which has found anything from 
small positives, to small negatives, to no relationship between the two variables.  The only 
remaining Level 2 covariate that was found to significantly contribute to the model was the 
presence of a performance-based funding program in the state (-0.031, p=0.033).  The negative 
relationship was consistent across all three of the outcome variables in the present study 
(GRADRATE, BLACKGRADRATE, and HISPGRADRATE).  
 Seven of the Level 1 variables were significant in the model: percentage of female 
students (-0.359, p=0.017); percentage of Pell grant recipients (-0.341, p=0.002); SAT scores at 
the 25th percentile (0.507, p<0.001); percentage of the faculty that is full-time (0.131, p=0.01); 
full-time equivalent student enrollment (0.026, p<0.001); tuition and fees (0.021, p<0.001); and 
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percentage of institutional revenue from tuition and fees (-0.286, p=0.014).  The direction of all 
of these relationships is consistent with prior research with the exception of the percentage of 
institutional revenue from tuition.  Interestingly, minority student percentage was not found to 
significantly contribute to this model examining Hispanic student graduation rates.  Given prior 
research as well as the results of Model E with black student graduation rates, I would have 
expected to see a similar positive relationship between minority student percentage and Hispanic 
student graduation rates.   
 
Research Question 3 – Does state public higher education funding via appropriations or 
financial aid affect institutions with greater proportions of minority students differently than 
institutions with lower proportions of minority students on the outcome of institutional 
graduation rates? 
 Finally, to answer the question about how funding vehicles may affect institutions with 
greater percentages of minority students differently than their institutions with fewer minority 
students as a percentage of the student body, I ran an exploratory slopes-as-outcomes model 
(MODEL G).  This model allowed the slopes of MINPERC to vary randomly, and also included 
an interaction effect at Level 2 between the three funding vehicles and MINPERC. 
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MODEL G: SLOPES-AS-OUTCOMES MODEL 
Final estimation of fixed effects 
(with robust standard errors)  
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
 Approx. 
d.f.  p-value 
For INTRCPT1, β0  
    INTRCPT2, γ00  0.505441 0.015071 33.538 492 <0.001 
    APPPC, γ01  -0.055348 0.066875 -0.828 492 0.408 
    NEEDAID, γ02  1.006773 0.326185 3.087 492 0.002 
    MERITAID, γ03  0.622908 0.212348 2.933 492 0.004 
     PBF, γ04  -0.026896 0.007987 -3.367 492 <0.001 
    UNEMPLOY, γ05  1.230985 0.373565 3.295 492 0.001 
    INCOME, γ06  0.009729 0.001555 6.255 492 <0.001 
    POPBACHD, γ07  -0.004973 0.001536 -3.239 492 0.001 
    GOVPARTY, γ08  -0.027880 0.012815 -2.176 492 0.030 
    LEGMAJPA, γ09  0.008193 0.014189 0.577 492 0.564 
    GOVBOARD, γ010  0.023829 0.010645 2.239 492 0.026 
    PRIVTOPU, γ011  -0.009815 0.035021 -0.280 492 0.779 
For MINPERC slope, β1  
    INTRCPT2, γ10  0.002814 0.007120 0.395 512 0.693 
    APPPC, γ11  0.241508 0.043505 5.551 512 <0.001 
    NEEDAID, γ12  0.004231 0.269850 0.016 512 0.987 
    MERITAID, γ13  0.077002 0.253553 0.304 512 0.761 
For FEMALE slope, β2  
    INTRCPT2, γ20  -0.131102 0.073926 -1.773 492 0.077 
For PELLPERC slope, β3  
    INTRCPT2, γ30  -0.453007 0.055037 -8.231 492 <0.001 
For SAT25 slope, β4  
    INTRCPT2, γ40  0.218604 0.077564 2.818 492 0.005 
For SAT75 slope, β5  
    INTRCPT2, γ50  0.060540 0.075049 0.807 492 0.420 
For OUTST slope, β6  
    INTRCPT2, γ60  0.069622 0.025571 2.723 492 0.007 
For FTFAC slope, β7  
    INTRCPT2, γ70  0.224363 0.027866 8.052 492 <0.001 
For CARNEGIE slope, β8  
    INTRCPT2, γ80  -0.010970 0.005767 -1.902 492 0.058 
For FTE slope, β9  
    INTRCPT2, γ90  0.031495 0.004345 7.249 492 <0.001 
For TUITION slope, β10  
    INTRCPT2, γ100  0.021620 0.002417 8.946 492 <0.001 
For REVTUITI slope, β11  
    INTRCPT2, γ110  -0.183044 0.062533 -2.927 492 0.004 
For EXPINSTR slope, β12  
    INTRCPT2, γ120  0.124167 0.074297 1.671 492 0.095 
For EXPSS slope, β13  
    INTRCPT2, γ130  -0.153057 0.127258 -1.203 492 0.230 
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Final estimation of variance components 
Random Effect Standard  Deviation 
Variance 
 Component   d.f. χ
2 p-value 
MINPERC, u1 0.02298 0.00053 512 530.93752 0.272 
level-1, r 0.07249 0.00525       
 
 I would like to make two notes regarding the output tables for Model G.  First, in addition 
to the intercept value for each of the three funding vehicles (γ11, γ12, and γ13), this model also 
includes the interaction effect between minority student percentage and each of the three funding 
vehicles.  These slopes are represented by the γ11, γ12, and γ13 figures in the fixed effects table.  
And second, the degrees of freedom for the interaction effects differ from the rest of the 
covariates in the model as HLM calculates degrees of freedom differently for fixed and random 
effects.  That is, degrees of freedom for fixed effects are measured as the difference between the 
total number of Level 1 units and the number of fixed effects in the model, or 516-24=492 (SSI, 
2016). The degrees of freedom for random effects are measured as the number of γ’s that are 
associated with a given β (SSI, 2016). In this case there are four γ’s (γ10, γ11, γ12, and γ13 
representing the intercept, and the three funding vehicles of appropriations, need-based aid, and 
merit-based aid) associated with β1, or minority student percentage.  Thus, the degrees of 
freedom for the random effects are 516-4=512. 
From the results of Model G, the only interaction effect that was significant was that of 
appropriations per capita and minority student percentage (γ11=0.242, p<0.001).  That is, while 
there was no significant difference in the relationship between appropriations per capita and 
institutional graduation rates across all states/institutions (γ01=-0.055, p=0.408), there was 
significant variation across groups of institutions when taking minority student percentage into 
account.  As seen in the Model G fixed effects table above, the interaction effect of minority 
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student percentage and appropriations per capita was significant (γ11=0.242, p<0.001), 
suggesting that the relationship between appropriations and graduation rates differs across 
institutions with varying percentages of minority students. γ10 (.0028) refers to the expected slope 
for graduation rates and appropriations per capita when minority percentage is equal to the grand 
mean for minority student percentage, and γ11 (.242) represents the change in the slope of the 
regression line for graduation rates and appropriations per capita across institutions when 
minority percentage increases by 1 point.  The positive result for γ11 suggests that appropriations 
per capita is more strongly correlated with graduation rates in high minority percentage 
institutions as compared to low minority institutions.  In fact, the relationship between 
appropriations per capita and graduation rates is stronger by .242 points as minority percentage 
increases by one point. In effect, this finding reveals that graduation rates at institutions with 
greater percentages of minority students are impacted by swings in state appropriations more 
than institutions with lower percentages of minority students.  For example, funding policy that 
decreases appropriations could be expected to correlate with lower graduation rates at high 
minority enrollment institutions as compared to low minority enrollment schools.  This could be 
due to differences in how minority students fund their higher education as compared to white 
students (i.e. greater reliance on student loans to cover net tuition price) or to differences 
between minority students and white students in sensitivity to tuition increases.  That is, 
appropriations are commonly used to keep in-state tuition low, and as appropriations decrease, 
the sticker price of tuition generally increases.  As minority students are more greatly impacted 
by tuition price increases than their white counterparts (Heller, 1997), perhaps this relationship 
between appropriations and graduation rates that differs across institutions with varied minority 
student enrollment percentages is explained by minority students’ tuition sensitivity. 
 	 103	
 Finally, the p-value for the random effect of MINPERC, u1 was not significant 
(τ11=0.00053, d.f.=512, χ2=530.94, p=0.272), suggesting that no additional significant state-level 
differences in the effect of minority student percentage remain to be explained.  Additionally, the 
HLM reliability estimate for this model dropped to 0.073, suggesting that the true score variance 
at Level 2 was much lower in proportion to the error variance when minority student percentage 
was assigned a random effect.  This low reliability estimate could mean that minority student 
percentage should be reconsidered as a fixed effect rather than random in subsequent analyses.  
That is, while low reliability scores do not necessarily discredit models in HLM (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002), they do indicate that there is too much error involved in the relationship of the 
variables and data in question (Lietz, 1996). 
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Chapter 5 - Discussion 
As higher education is a function whose oversight lies at the state level, there are fifty 
separate funding strategies for public higher education involving varied levels of appropriations, 
need-based aid, and/or merit-based aid. However, there is no consistent or national evaluation of 
the use of the three funding vehicles on the outcome of graduation rates. Six-year graduation rate 
averages below 60% for public institutions and even dramatically lower rates for minority 
students, coupled with record high tuition prices at public colleges and universities, are 
contributing to a major financial issue in this country as student debt soars.  In effect, taxpayers 
are subsidizing public higher education, but more than 40% of students will not graduate within 
six years or at all, thus raising concerns about the effectiveness of current funding strategies.  
And as more and more students turn to student loans to fund their education, often dropping out 
before obtaining their degree and increasing their employability and income potential, the current 
high level of drop-out is problematic for all Americans as rising debt has a ripple effect in the 
economy beyond just the student who has borrowed the loans.  Through this study, I sought to 
examine national data on public colleges and universities in order to identify any potential 
correlation between how a state funds higher education and how well institutions graduate 
students within that state.   
 Utilizing multilevel modeling and national data, I examined the relationship between 
state funding vehicles of appropriations and/or student financial aid and institutional six-year 
graduation rates. Additionally, in an effort to determine whether funding policies affect 
underrepresented minority groups (black students and Hispanic students) differently than their 
white counterparts, I also evaluated the correlation between funding vehicles and minority 
student graduation rates, and determined whether the correlation between funding vehicles and 
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graduation rates varies between institutions with greater percentages of minority students and 
those with a less diverse student population.  Through these methods, I addressed the following 
research questions: 
1. How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of institutional appropriations 
and student financial aid associated with six-year graduation rates at four-year, public 
institutions? 
2. How, if at all, are state higher education funding vehicles of institutional appropriations 
and student financial aid associated with black and Hispanic student six-year graduation 
rates at four-year, public institutions? 
3. Does state public higher education funding via appropriations or financial aid affect 
institutions with greater proportions of minority students differently than institutions with 
lower proportions of minority students on the outcome of institutional graduation rates? 
Summary of findings 
 In terms of my primary research question, I found that appropriations per capita, need-
based financial aid, and merit-based financial aid were all significantly related to graduation 
rates.  The negative direction of the appropriations result and positive direction of the need-based 
aid result are consistent with prior research.  The positive relationship between merit-based aid 
and graduation rates adds to a body of literature that has found mixed results – likely due to the 
either/or approach of those studies which compared need-based aid to merit-based aid.  A key 
takeaway from the results of the present study is that perhaps funding that is tied to a student 
rather than to an institution can be a greater motivator for a student to persist.  This concept is 
discussed further in the implications for future research section. 
 	 106	
 As for the second research question pertaining to minority student graduation rates, the 
results were not the same for black students and Hispanic students.  While merit-based financial 
aid was significant and positively related to graduation rates for both minority groups, need-
based financial aid was only significant in the model for black student graduation rates.  And 
while appropriations per capita was significant in the model examining overall institutional 
graduation rates, it was not significant in the models with minority student graduation rates as the 
outcome variable.  Again, the student-specific funding vehicles of need-based and merit-based 
aid correlated with increased graduation rates for black students, and merit-based aid correlated 
with increased Hispanic graduation rates. 
 And for the third research question pertaining to the relationship between funding 
vehicles and graduation rates across institutions with varying degrees of minority student 
percentage, the main effects of need-based financial aid and merit-based financial aid were both 
significant in the model, however the interaction effect between the two funding vehicles and 
minority student percentage were not significant.  In terms of appropriations, while the 
relationship between appropriations per capita and institutional graduation rates did not vary 
significantly across states, there was significant variation in the relationship when institutional 
minority student percentage was taken into account as the interaction effect of appropriations and 
minority student percentage was significant.   That is, shifts in state appropriations impact 
institutions with higher minority student percentages greater than institutions with lower 
percentages of minority student enrollment.   
Implications for policy 
 My interest in studying funding vehicles and graduation rates stems from the question of 
whether or not taxpayer funds are effectively invested in public higher education, and therefore it 
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makes sense to put the results of the study into context in terms of policy implications.  As such, 
I have identified three key policy implications from the results of the present study: a need to 
continue the emphasis on need-based financial aid in funding policy; a caution about 
overreliance on direct appropriations; and a consideration of how swapping funding from one 
vehicle to another can impact students and graduation rates. 
Continue the emphasis on need-based financial aid 
Need-based financial aid was found significant across three of the models: the primary 
model examining institutional graduation rates, the model examining black student graduation 
rates, and the model examining institutional graduation rates after taking the interaction effect of 
funding vehicles and minority student percentage into account.  Like other studies on state 
funding and graduation rate outcomes, the results of the present study seem to support the notion 
that funding tied to a specific student who otherwise would likely not be able to afford to attend 
college is an effective way to encourage persistence to degree completion.  By its nature, need-
based financial aid certainly expands access for populations that would otherwise find it difficult 
or impossible to attend college, but results such as those of prior research (Chen & St. John, 
2011; Titus, 2006) as well as the present study, demonstrate that there is also a correlation 
between need-based aid and persistence to graduation.  For example, of the top ten states with 
the greatest levels of need-based financial aid per capita, eight (New York, New Jersey, 
Washington, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Minnesota, California, and North Carolina) have mean 
graduation rates that are higher than the national average.   
Be mindful about reliance on appropriations 
While the present study found a significant negative relationship between reliance on 
appropriations and institutional graduation rates, appropriations dollars are by far the lion’s share 
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of state funding at 86% of all state contributions to higher education in 2013 (Grapevine, 2015; 
NASSGAP, 2014).  Appropriations will never go away completely (nor should they), as they are 
a means for the state to incentivize some desirable program or policy at institutions such as 
keeping tuition low for in-state students, to expand program offerings to fill workforce needs 
unique to that state, or to provide beneficial outreach or extension into the community.  
Appropriations also can serve as a straight-line form of revenue for institutions, which differs 
from tuition or fee revenues.  Additionally, appropriations help keep the sticker price of college 
down, perhaps preventing some students from forgoing a college education because they do not 
think they can afford it.  Again, minority and low-income students are particularly sensitive to 
increases in sticker price (Horn, Chen, & Chapman, 2003).  However, when taking the current 
state of higher education and its relationship with the economy in terms of public investment in 
colleges and universities as well as student debt levels into account, perhaps such a reliance on 
appropriations should be reconsidered.  And in examining the correlation between a reliance on 
appropriations and graduation rates, only two of the top ten states (Wyoming and North 
Carolina) in terms of appropriations per capita had a mean graduation rate higher than the 
national average. 
Consider the impact of funding vehicle swaps 
Each funding vehicle has benefits such as the political popularity of appropriations 
dollars that keep in-state tuition low; the increased access for low income students through need-
based aid; and the in-state retention of high performing students through merit-based aid.  
However, when education stakeholders or policymakers push the use of a certain type of funding 
vehicle, it often happens at the detriment or reduction of another vehicle.  For example, state 
increases in merit-based financial aid frequently occur in tandem with decreases in need-based 
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aid.  And given the significant result in the model examining the interaction effect of funding 
vehicles and percentage of minority enrollment, special attention should be paid to how funding 
swaps can impact at-risk student groups that already have lower graduation rates.  A 
consideration of the impact from moving funding from one vehicle to another should be key in 
all discussions on state funding policy. 
Recommendations for future research 
 I offer the following suggestions on expanding the present study and existing literature on 
funding vehicles and graduation rates: revise the sample; expand the dependent variable; 
consider different predictor variables to include in the models; utilize more complex modeling 
techniques; and expand the theoretical lens with which the topic is viewed. 
 First, I suggest that there is a need to expand the sample of studies examining funding 
vehicles and graduation rates to include two-year institutions.  More than 40% of students 
entering college in the fall of 2015 were enrolled in community colleges and other two-year 
institutions (U.S. Department of Education, 2015b).  As much of the research on state and local 
funding is centered around four-year institutions, there is still much to be learned about how 
students in community colleges are impacted by state funding vehicles of appropriations and 
financial aid.  However, like prior research on community college outcomes, the dependent 
variable in such a study would have to capture the transfer to a four-year program as a successful 
outcome comparable to degree completion.  
 In addition to expanding the sample, future research could also restrict the sample to only 
model the relationship between funding vehicle and graduation rates at certain types of 
institutions.  For example, it could be interesting to examine the relationship at elite, highly-
selective institutions or at open-admissions colleges and universities.  Segmenting the data could 
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make sense as the students who attend different types of institutions often vary dramatically, as 
well as how the students fund their education (i.e. how reliant they are on state subsidies or 
support).  That is, such a study could further the understanding of how state funding vehicles 
relate to graduation rates. 
 Similarly, another avenue for future research could include the utilization of a dependent 
variable that goes beyond that of the six-year graduation rate statistic in IPEDS. For example, 
while the IPEDS measure will change in future surveys, transfer or returning students were not 
captured in the IPEDS graduation rate measure used in the present study.  While this has been a 
known and accepted limitation in prior research, perhaps the time has come to stop only focusing 
only on the traditional college student and instead expand the lens to study the broader student 
populations in this country.  A 2014 industry study, for example, highlights the gap in graduation 
rates between first-time and non-first-time students at public four-year institutions; with 
returning student graduation rates averaging 27% lower than their first-time counterparts 
(UPCEA, 2014).  If rates lower than 60% for full-time, first-time students are cause for concern, 
then the situation is even that much worse for students who dropped out of college but chose to 
return in pursuit of a degree.  In a perfect research world, we would have access to more data on 
such students, and perhaps the collection of such data should be prioritized by education 
stakeholders at the state and national levels.  
 Additionally, future studies could also include number of graduates as a dependent 
variable along with, or in place of, graduation rates.  As an example, graduation rates can 
increase drastically if admissions standards are raised.  That is, students who may wish to attend 
college but perhaps do not have high enough standardized test scores or who may require some 
remedial courses would be denied admission. While the present study is built on the notion that 
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low graduation rates are bad for the economy and the American taxpayer, decreasing access to 
increase graduation rates would also be bad for this country.  That is, there must be a balance 
between ensuring access for low income students while also making sure that colleges and 
universities retain program standards and produce graduates that have received a quality 
education and not just a piece of paper. 
 Also, information on debt burden in relation to earnings could serve this line of research 
as an outcome variable.  That is, even if students are graduating from an institution in a timely 
fashion, it still might not be good for the economy if the levels of debt are high compared to the 
earning potential for its students following graduation.  The U.S. Department of Education 
collects such data from institutions for its College Scorecard, and could serve as a key data 
source for such a line of inquiry. 
 Next, future research could consider different predictor variables to include in the model.  
For example, significant p-values for Models B, C, and D above suggest there is still unexplained 
variance between the Level 2 intercepts of graduation rate.  Inclusion of additional or different 
predictor variables might explain some of the variation in state mean graduation rates.  As a 
point of mention, there were several Level 2 variables that were significant across all the models 
and others that were not significant at all.  For example, unemployment rate and income per 
capita were significant in all models that utilized institutional graduation rates as the dependent 
variable, while the political variable measuring the political party affiliation of the governor was 
not found to be significant in any of the models except for Model G (GOVPARTY γ08=-0.0278, 
d.f.=492, p=0.03), and the variable measuring the legislative majority of the state legislature was 
not significant in any of the models.  Political variables should certainly be accounted for in 
future examinations of state funding vehicles, but perhaps there are additional or different means 
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of capturing this influence.  That is, while elected officials do generally identify themselves as 
either a Democrat or a Republican, their policy agendas are nuanced and complex, and may not 
be adequately or accurately represented by a dichotomous variable as was done in the present 
study.  Future research could design a more nuanced variable or variables to include in a model 
that would better capture the effect of political party affiliation on such outcomes as graduation 
rates.  This type of variable would be highly beneficial for the research community as it could 
contribute to all types of social research, and not just questions about state funding and 
graduation rates. 
Further, future studies could utilize even more complex modeling techniques to gain a 
deeper understanding of how various funding vehicles impact graduation rates.  For example, 
future multilevel examinations on this topic could expand the use of random effects (slopes) for 
certain or significant covariates in the models.  Or, while not likely feasible outside of a massive 
coordinated nationwide research effort due to challenges of obtaining student data across 
multiple states, a 3-level HLM model could be employed in which the student-level data is not 
aggregated to the institutional level, but rather serves as Level 1 data while Level 2 becomes the 
institution impact, and Level 3 becomes the state political and economic factors.  Such a 
technique would allow for the use of more granular data at the student level that is not possible 
under a design where student data is aggregated to the institutional level. Again, this would be a 
huge research undertaking, but perhaps strategic sampling techniques would reduce the number 
of states for which data would have to be obtained but still allow for a national view of the 
relationship between state funding vehicles and graduation rates. 
Finally, a qualitative view of the relationship between state funding and graduation rates 
could be beneficial.  The existing literature is predominantly quantitative and overwhelmingly 
 	 113	
finds that need-based aid is better than appropriations in terms of institutional graduation rates, 
and that the same holds for need-based aid as compared to merit-based aid.  However, there is 
further to go in terms of understanding why this correlation exists.  That is, why does need-based 
aid seem to work so well in encouraging persistence?  For example, perhaps it is not just that aid 
is being provided to students who need the financial assistance to attend college, but rather that it 
is financial aid tied to a particular student that is the motivator.  It would follow, then, that merit-
based financial aid would also be a stronger motivator for student persistence than 
appropriations.  However, the existing quantitative literature focuses primarily on questions of 
need-based aid OR appropriations, and need-based aid OR merit-based aid.  Perhaps it would be 
helpful to expand the examination of funding vehicles and graduation rates to also include 
qualitative and/or mixed methods that more deeply explore this relationship between student-
specific financial aid and persistence. That is, beyond further quantitative analyses such as that of 
the present study, there is more to know from a qualitative perspective about why students seem 
to persist at different rates under varying funding policies.  As an example, motivation theory 
concepts could be used to guide future studies in order to gain a more in-depth understanding of 
student persistence to graduation. 
Conclusion 
 There is no one-size-fits-all approach toward funding public higher education, and there 
will never be a funding strategy that fully satisfies the demands of all stakeholders.  That is, 
when stakeholders include such diverse groups as students, parents, faculty, administrators, 
elected officials, education advocates, and taxpayers, the priorities of each of these groups often 
represent mutually exclusive policy options.  Adding to the complexity of the issue is the notion 
that colleges and universities produce more than just college graduates.  That is, the missions of 
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these institutions also include a commitment to conducting research and/or providing outreach or 
extension into the community and the entire state population.  Considering the varied and 
complex missions of public colleges and universities, it is important for every state to consider 
what is important for their citizens, and funding policies should be formed on the basis of what 
will have the most positive impact on the state in terms of producing employable graduates, 
furthering research and knowledge, providing extension to support and assist state industry, 
retaining high-performing students in the state, and/or keeping tuition at manageable levels, 
while also maintaining a commitment to lessening the barriers to education for low income and 
minority students.  Taxpayer dollars are being invested into public higher education, and 
consistent evaluation of the effectiveness of that investment as it pertains to the outcome of 
graduation rates should be expected.  Research such as the present study can assist in policy 
conversations by providing evidence regarding the relationship between state funding vehicles 
and graduation rates.    
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
  
Unstandardized+
Coefficients
Standardized+
Coefficients t Sig.
B Std.+Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) ).180 .101 )1.788 .074
MINPERC .007 .007 .040 1.094 .275 0.30 3.28
FEMALE ).141 .071 ).049 )1.986 .048 0.67 1.50
PELLPERC ).432 .043 ).387 )10.098 .000 0.28 3.63
SAT25 .253 .070 .179 3.600 .000 0.16 6.13
SAT75 .038 .064 .028 .582 .561 0.18 5.65
OUTST .054 .024 .059 2.242 .025 0.59 1.69
FTFAC .244 .026 .239 9.471 .000 0.64 1.57
CARNEGIE ).011 .006 ).070 )1.854 .064 0.28 3.55
FTE .030 .004 .244 6.818 .000 0.31 3.18
TUITION .020 .002 .280 8.706 .000 0.39 2.56
REVTUITION ).153 .047 ).110 )3.224 .001 0.35 2.87
EXPINSTR .085 .067 .035 1.261 .208 0.53 1.89
EXPSS ).163 .122 ).037 )1.332 .184 0.52 1.92
APPPC ).124 .057 ).068 )2.184 .029 0.42 2.36
NEEDAID .962 .329 .093 2.924 .004 0.40 2.48
MERITAID .524 .218 .063 2.410 .016 0.59 1.70
PBF ).033 .009 ).099 )3.913 .000 0.64 1.57
UNEMPLOY 1.090 .361 .086 3.019 .003 0.50 2.01
INCOME .008 .001 .252 5.265 .000 0.18 5.67
POPBACHDEG ).004 .001 ).114 )2.712 .007 0.23 4.37
GOVPARTY ).026 .013 ).055 )1.968 .050 0.52 1.93
LEGMAJPARTY ).018 .014 ).042 )1.296 .196 0.39 2.54
GOVBOARD .024 .010 .066 2.260 .024 0.48 2.10
PRIVTOPUB .014 .035 .011 .387 .699 0.49 2.06
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